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Abstract
Irrigation is of great importance for the agriculturally-predominant country of
Kyrgyzstan, and the adequate operation and maintenance (O&M) of irrigation
systems is required to support agricultural productivity in the country. A process of
irrigation management transfer from the government to farm-based Water Users
Associations (WUAs) has been pursued in the country for about a decade, but the
results of institutionalization of WUAs are mixed. This thesis aims to explore the
factors enabling the development of WUAs to manage O&M of irrigation
infrastructure and ensure equitable and reliable water distribution to farmers. The
research results show that WUAs are still too institutionally and financially fragile to
secure the long-term physical sustainability of on-farm irrigation structures and
reliable water distribution. The absence of the rule of law, financial and management
incapability of WUAs, ignorance of water users about WUAs and their mandate,
inactive participation of farmers and their lack of commitment to contribute to
organizational initiatives, among other factors, are concluded to be core elements
jeopardizing the development of WUAs. Based on this analysis, recommendations
for sustainable development of these farm-based water management organizations
are provided.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank the Edmund S. Muskie/Freedom Support Act Graduate
Fellowship Program and College of Liberal Arts of Rochester Institute of
Technology for provision of funds to undertake this research. I am particularly
grateful to Associate Professor James Winebrake of Rochester Institute of
Technology for his advice and support in this research. My appreciation also goes to
the staff of On-Farm Irrigation Management Project of the World Bank in
Kyrgyzstan for assistance in the arrangement ofmy field trip.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 7
1.1 background 7
1.2 Irrigated land andwater resources 10
1.3 Conclusion 13
CHAPTER 2: IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 14
2.1 Irrigationmanagement during the Soviet times 14
2.2 Post Soviet irrigationmanagement 16
2.3 Institutionalization ofWUAs and development of legal framework
forWUAs 20
2.4Conclusion 29
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 31
3.1 ResearchQuestion 31
3.2 ResearchApproach 34
3.3 Data Collection 37
3.4Conclusion 38
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULTS 40
4.1 Structure of theDataAnalysis 40




4.6 Inter-Institutional Performance 89
4.7 OverallConclusion 95
CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS 99
5.1 Presentation ofRecommendations 99
5.2 Recommendations to ImproveLegal Performance 99
5.3 Recommendations to Improve Financial Performance 107
5 .4 Recommendations to ImproveOperational Performance 115
5 . 5 Recommendations to ImproveOrganizationalPerformance 121
5.6Recommendations to Improve Inter-InstitutionalPerformance 128
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 131
6.1 Conclusions 131
6.2 Key Issues forFutureResearch 137
REFERENCES: 139
LIST OF FIGURES 142
LIST OF TABLES 143
Annex 1. Survey Form -Managers ofWUAs 144













Cooperative Farm Operated during the Soviet Times
Ministry ofWater Resources during the Soviet Union
Province Water ManagementUnit
DistrictWaterManagement Unit
Governing Board ofWater User Associations (WUAs)
Currency of the Soviet Union
Currency ofKyrgyzstan
State Farm Operated during the Soviet Times
Village Government Authority



















Ministry ofAgriculture, Water Resources and Agro-
Processing in Kyrgyzstan
National Poverty Reduction Strategy





Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked country located in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan
became an independent country in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Since that time, the country has embarked on massive socio-economic and political
reforms to place the country onto a democracy and market-oriented economy. The
results of these reforms have beenmixed.
Figure 1.1: Map ofKyrgyzstan
'"<<.>-''
Pakistan
Source: www.askasia.org/image/maps/kyrgyzl . htm
The slow growth of industrial and service sectors, and the lack of diversified
natural resources in the country, except water and poorly developed non-ferrous
metal reserves, make the national economy heavily reliant on agriculture. In fact,
agriculture has been the core economic sector ofKyrgyzstan since its break-up from
the Soviet Union. The agricultural sector has consistently accounted for around 40%
ofGDP; generating 36.8% ofGDP in 2000, 37.3% in 2001 and 38.6% in 2002 (WB,
2003). The interrelation between the national economy and agriculture is presented
in Figure 1 .2 depicting the GDP growth trend and the output rate in agriculture from
1995 to 2003.
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Source: Asian DevelopmentBank, www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2003/pdf/KGZ.pdf
Agriculture also remains one of the key export sectors, contributing 20.45%
of all exports from 1995 to 2002. Furthermore, agriculture employs almost half of
the population in the country, particularly in rural areas where two-thirds of the
population resides; the country has a population of five million people. The
employment rate in the agricultural sector rose from 32.7% in 1985 to 53.2% in
2001, as shown in Table 1.1, because other sectors of the national economy did not
create alternative jobs. However, the income from farming remains very low.
Approximately 48% of the total population live below the national poverty line, and
the GDP per capita for 2002 was one of the lowest among the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), declining from USD1,550 in 1991 to USD290 in 2002 (in
real dollars).
Table 1. 1: Employment Rate in Agricultural Sector, 1985-2001
Year 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001
Employed in
Agriculture (out of
total population) 32.7% 32.7% 46.9% 49.1% 52.4% 53.1% 53.2%
Source: Kyrgyz StatisticsDepartment, www.stat-gvc.bishkek.su/Rus/Database/tabl2.xls
The development of agriculture is a government priority, as it is expected to
drive the country toward economic recovery and future growth. Kyrgyzstan is
planning to expand its agricultural production to reduce imports and increase foreign
exchange. In this light, the National Comprehensive Development Framework
Strategy for 2002-2010, a long-term development program, outlines that
development of agriculture and agribusiness should make the national growth
process progressive and broad-based (CDF, 2001).
However, the agricultural sector has been experiencing a number of
challenges. The transition from central planning to privatization of collective and
state farms as well as processing enterprises has resulted in the dislocation of
elements of agricultural production, processing, and marketing systems. Another
significant factor is that agriculture in Kyrgyzstan is predominantly based on
irrigation, which consumes around 94% of the national water resources retained in
the country, but deterioration of irrigation and drainage structures threatens
agricultural production and has arisen social concerns over water distribution in areas
where water is scarce.
1.2 Irrigated land and water resources
In general, Kyrgyzstan has abundant water resources fed by glaciers and
snow melt, but a balance between available water and the potentially irrigable land
area varies tremendously between different catchments and different provinces,
causing local deficits ofwater and threatening crop yields.
The average natural surface water flow, all internally generated, is estimated
at 44.05 km3/year ofwhich ~ by international agreement with downstream countries
of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
-
only 11 km3/year, which comprises
around 25% of the total, can be retained in the country. The annual renewable
groundwater resources have been estimated at 13.6 km /year, of which about
11.2km3/year is common to surface water resources. The groundwater resources
have been estimated at 3.39 km3/year, mainly in the Chu River basin, the Syr Darya
River basin, and the Issyk-Kul depression (Aquastat, 1997).
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Precipitation varies greatly with topography and altitude with an average
annual rate at 533 mm, varying from 150 mm in the plains to over 1,000 mm in the
mountains. Precipitation mainly falls outside the agricultural growing season, from
April to September, and therefore, rain-fed agriculture is very limited. During the
growing season the mean precipitation in Bishkek, Jalal-Abad, and Osh is 229, 179
and 119 mm respectively, while the mean reference crop evapotranspiration during
the same period is 886, 806 and 947 mm (WB Project Information, 2000). The arid
and semi-arid soil patterns and very low precipitation rates during the growing
season create significant reliance of agriculture on irrigation.
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Source: Food andAgriculturalAgency (FAO), www.fao.org/ag/agl/swlwpnr/reports/y_nr/z_kg/kg_map/kgmap
The irrigation potential has been estimated at about 2.25 million hectares
(Mha). The government reported that as of January 2003 Kyrgyzstan possessed
1,344,900 hectares (ha) of arable land ofwhich 1,047,000 ha are irrigated cropland
11
accounting for around 76% of total arable land; however, actual irrigation still covers
less than halfof the irrigated potential (Land Statistics, 2003).
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Source: Kyrgyz Government, Kyrgyz Land Statistics, Resolution #411 dated 7/2003
Irrigated cropland is developed mainly in the Syr Darya River basin
embracing Jalal-Abad, Osh and Naryn provinces, in the Talas and Chu River basins
where Talas and Chui provinces are located, and in Issyk-Kul province around Issyk-
Kul Lake. To irrigate land in these provinces, massive off-farm and on-farm
irrigation structures were constructed in Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet times. Overall,
around 21,400 km of on-farm schemes and 6,500 km of off-farm irrigation
structures, being currently under exploitation, were built during 1970s-1980s.
However, the quality of these constructions was far from being adequate despite of
large investments made under the Soviet system. The next chapter outlines the
deficiencies in Soviet and post-Soviet irrigation management.
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1.3 Conclusion
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy in Kyrgyzstan, and employs more
than half of the labor force in the country. The slow development of industrial and
service sectors positions the agricultural sector to drive the national economic
recovery. Yet, there are a large number of challenges confronted by agriculture.
Irrigation is a key input into the agricultural sector, reaching around 80% of
the cultivated area. Water resources in Kyrgyzstan are abundant, but there is
imbalance between available water and potentially irrigable land area. This causes
water scarcity in many provinces during a growing season, when precipitation rates
are normally low. Extensive schemes were constructed in Kyrgyzstan to irrigate land
during the Soviet era. The next chapter discusses management of irrigation sector in
the country during the Soviet and post-Soviet times.
13
CHAPTER 2: IRRIGATIONMANAGEMENT
2.1 Irrigation management during the Soviet times
The agricultural sector benefited from massive investments during the Soviet
era that created extensive irrigation and drainage (I&D) infrastructures under central
planning. Huge irrigation structures were constructed to irrigate semi-arid and arid
lands in the country, and entire communities of hundreds of thousands of people
came into being solely because of these constructions. In fact, the irrigated area in
the country doubled from 0.41 Mha in 1934 to 1.047 Mha ha in 2003. Figure 2.1
exhibits a historical trend of irrigation evolution in Kyrgyzstan.





















During the Soviet times, a typical command-order model was practiced to
manage the irrigation sector. Irrigation was fully subsidized byMinvodkhoz that had
departments in each province and district. The functional role of this agency included
water resources research, development and distribution, as well as construction,
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operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage structures at the inter-farm
level. Minvodkhoz was also in charge of distribution of national water resources
among provinces and districts, and monitoring this water allocation schedule
(Thurman, 2001). The water distribution for Central Asian countries used to be set
by the USSR Ministry ofWater Resources in Moscow, and was designed in a way
that upstream countries including Kyrgyzstan had to favor the downstream
cotton-
producing countries of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Soviet Union
pursued such a water allocation model in order to become a world leader in cotton
production through intensive irrigation of arid and semi-arid lands in Central Asia.
Irrigation systems in the country were operated to transport water to the large
sovkhozes and kolkhozes that managed I&D schemes at on-farm level. For this
purpose, irrigation units were established in every collective farm. A farm director
together with a district executive committee of the Communist Party and raivodkhoz
were the key decision-makers on on-farm water management that intended to meet
the mandated production targets. In fact, there was very limited participation of
farmers in the irrigation decision-making process.
It should be noted that irrigation systems during the Soviet times were not
well-managed, as often perceived. The irrigation inefficiencies had already appeared
long before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Minvodkhoz ran a
near-
monopoly on irrigation works. By law, the functions of customer, planner, and
contractor were concentrated within this single ministry. Departments to check on
the quality of construction and ensure the
efficient use ofwater resources were part
15
of the ministry, and oversight at the government level was minimal. One analyst
wrote in the mid-1980s that any producer in the irrigation development complex,
whether in the materials industry or a construction enterprise, in essence dictated its
own terms to the consumer. Thus, factories for building materials often acted on the
principle of "take what is
given"
and construction organizations accept the
installation as it
is"
(Thurman, 2001). Such a monopolistic position ofMinvodkhoz
resulted in construction and maintenance of low-quality I&D schemes.
This Ministry was initiating projects but not trying to adequately complete
construction and ensure proper operation and maintenance (O&M) of structures in
areas already irrigated. Therefore, irrigation infrastructures were left shoddily
constructed, even after a project was reported as "complete". After independence in
1991, it was discovered that I&D systems on roughly half of the area irrigated
required rehabilitation in Kyrgyzstan (Thurman, 2001).
2.2 Post Soviet irrigation management
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, government budgets have fallen
dramatically to operate I&D systems. In 1999, the government allocated USD3
million from the state budget for O&M, while about 65 percent of these funds came
as a grant from the European Union. These amounts represented only half of the
required funding needed for O&M of off-farm irrigation infrastructure on a
sustainable basis (WB Project Information, 2000). In 2002, approximately USD7.8
million were allotted for O&M of off-farm irrigation structures instead of the
USD13.6 million required. The same year, the on-farm irrigation schemes were
16
under-funded by around USD5.9 million, when actual expenses disbursed for O&M
approximated to USD4.7 million instead of USD10.6 million needed to sustain
irrigation structures. The insufficient funding provided for O&M of off-farm and
on-
farm irrigation systems have led to their deterioration (OIP, 2000).
The central, province and district agencies ofMinvodkhoz have substantially
weakened during the last decade. First, they limited their O&M activities to a
minimum because of lack of funding. Competent staff have left the agency because
of low salary or layoffs. Third, most of the construction enterprises, irrigation
research centers, and design institutes functioned as subsidiaries ofMinvodkhoz have
ceased their activities because of a lack of projects for which they used to receive
funding for during the Soviet planning system. The machinery pool of district water
agencies intended to maintain irrigation schemes has become very obsolete.
Sovkhozes and kolkhozes, which were responsible for O&M of on-farm
irrigation and drainage structures, were privatized when land reform started in 1991.
The national land reform, which is considered to be the most progressive among
Central Asian countries, has privatized agricultural enterprises and land. Before the
land reform, there were 287 sovkhozes in Kyrgyzstan that composed 58% of all rural
agricultural enterprises, 178 kolkhozes representing 35%, and 37 inter-farm agencies
constituting the remaining 7% of rural agricultural enterprises. By the end of 1991,
there were already about 2,000 private farms established in the country, holding 5
percent of the farmland (Chemonics, 2003). Table 2.1 depicts land use by farming
agency category after privatization in 1999.
17








Private Households 76,775 111.6 10.5
Peasant Farms 26,214 308 29
Collective Peasant Farms 222 149 14
Agricultural Joint-stock
companies 83 22.4 2.2
Agricultural Cooperatives 304 97.2 9.1
State farms 159 61.3 5.7
Village Committees 346 117 0.9
Household plots 617 19.8 1.8
State Reserve 390 56.9 5.3
Towns and settlements 26,781 120 11.5
TOTAL: 131,891 1,063 100
Source: Agricultural AssessmentReport, Chemonics International, 2003
As neither government nor the Village Councils, which primarily inherited
the on-farm irrigation canals of sovkhozes and kolkhozes, had funding available for
maintenance and rehabilitation of I&D structures, the system improvements came to
a standstill. Because most arable lands in the country are irrigated, this degradation
started threatening the crop production and causing land erosion.
One of the most widespread environmental effects mainly resulted from
inadequate drainage structures is the land salinization. As of January 2003, around
14,900 ha were considered highly saline in Kyrgyzstan, 31,600 ha moderately saline,
and 65,200 ha slightly saline (Only in Chuy region less than 20% of the irrigated
land is determined as salinized). Overall, it was estimated that 750,000 ha of
irrigated land would need drainage in the country but presently, only 136,000 ha
representing 13% of total irrigated area are
equipped for drainage that is also falling
into disrepair (Reclamation, 2004).
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High filtration from canals and high water application to crops mainly to
leach salinity has led to the waterlogged land. Currently, approximately 114,100 ha
of land are estimated as waterlogged in the country (Reclamation, 2004). The rise in
water tables started not only worsening crop yields but also devastating the health of
people. The groundwater filters into houses and buildings. People residing in these
buildings are exposed to damp conditions that cause the pneumonic and other
diseases (Thurman, 2001). Old people and children are seemingly the most
vulnerable to this condition.
The poor condition of canals resulted in water losses of at least 40% of the
total withdrawals, which measured per hectare, were astronomic by world standards
(up to 18,000 cubic meter/ha). If in 1992 the losses made 1354.7mln m3, at
agricultural water use of 9889.8mln m3, in 1998 they made 1779.8mln m3, at
utilization of 5597.6mln m . Because of a decrease of capacity of canals, the intake
in the canals reduced too. The coefficient of efficiency, which measures the volume
ofwater delivered to irrigation plots and the volume diverted from the supply source,
in off-farm irrigation systems from 1992 to 2001 decreased from 0.70 to 0.65. So,
the efficiency ofwater use decreased for the decade almost to 20% (Aquastat, FAO,
1997). The coefficient of efficiency of on-farm irrigation structures is also very low,
which was estimated to be 0.56 in 2002 (WUA Unit, 2004).
In 2002, as government reported, around 7.5% of all arable land in
Kyrgyzstan was left uncultivated due the lack of agricultural input supplies and the
reduction of investments for rehabilitation and maintenance of I&D systems, which
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caused the insufficient water supply, soil salinity, and waterlogging. The most
affected districts were Aravan and Kara-Suu Districts in Osh Region, Batken District
in Batken Region, Kara-Buura District in Talas Region, and many districts in Chuy
Region (Land Statistics, Kyrgyz Government, 2003).
2.3 Institutionalization of WUAs and development of legal framework for
WUAs
Privatization of former collective farms on the one side and the government's
inability to manage I&D structures on the other side have resulted in an institutional
gap in governing the on-farm irrigation systems. In order to attack this structural
vacuum, in March 1994 the government issued a primary legal instrument, the
decree "Measures to Maintain and Finance Public Irrigation
Infrastructure"
. This
document instructed the Ministry ofWater Resources to transfer the on-farm I&D
schemes to the ownership and management of Village Councils, existing kolkhozes
and sovkohzes, and newly established farming enterprises (Government Resolution
#113, 1994). As the new farms were financially and institutionally very weak to
manage such structures and the former collective farms were under privatization, the
Village Councils remained to assume responsibility to run the on-farm I&D
structures. In addition to this new task, the Village Councils were already assigned to
maintain rural schools, clinics, roads, and water drinking systems, but were
chronically lacking financial resources to keep these social infrastructures at an
adequate level. Adding this new responsibility to the burdensome management
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portfolio of Village Councils had not brought improvements in operation of I&D
systems, which continued to further deteriorate.
This decree was the first legal instrument envisaging some structural changes
in on-farm irrigation management - transfer of on-farm irrigation systems from a
centralized water agency to local organizations; but it failed to spell out the ways for
empowering Village Councils to operate I&D structures. In this perspective, this
decree was a typical policy paper that used to be adopted during the first transitional
years in the country when implementation and empowerment mechanisms to attain
policy outputs were normally omitted. Chronic insolvency of the state budget and
slow development of private institutions drove the government to assign under
funded state agencies with more and more responsibilities to manage public goods
and services butwithout any institutional and financial support.
It is necessary to note that water continued to be used by farmers free of
charge as it was practiced during the entire Soviet era. This resulted in
over-
consumption of water by farmers and an increase of budget deficits for O&M of
irrigation systems.
Later in 1994, the government issued a second decree "Regulations to
Distribute Water and Operate Irrigation Systems". This decree spelled out that
responsibility for maintenance of on-farm irrigation system should gradually be
transferred from Village Councils to water users. For this purpose, the decree raised
the need for farmers to establish water user organizations to deal with management
of I&D structures and water distribution (Government Resolution #284, 1994).
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The second decree articulated only basic provisions for institution of water
user organizations, but it largely ignored procedures concerning management and
monitoring such agencies: there were no provisions defining its internal
organizational structure, financial management, scope of authorized activities, and
other legal guidelines required to operate a functional water user organization.
Overall, this act presumably failed to become a viable legal and regulatory tool to
develop a strong water institution formanaging on-farm irrigation system.
2.3.1 Water User Association Resolution (1995)
Conceiving the absence of a solid legal framework to promote the
development of water user organizations, the government enacted a comprehensive
resolution on water users associations (WUAs) in June 1995. This act stipulated that
WUAs would be legal entities voluntarily established by individual households and
farming organizations. WUAs were to be instituted either as a unitary water
organization to solely deal with irrigation services or as amultifunctional association
entitled both with agricultural production, processing and marketing as well as
irrigation services. The statute authorized government agencies and commercial
enterprises to joinWUA (Government Resolution #226, 1995).
This act was the first national statute formally legalizing the establishment of
WUAs. It provided a detailed description regarding the scope of functions ofWUA;
outlined financial management fundamentals, and stipulated basics of organizational
structure. However, a number of substantial drawbacks deterred the evolvement and
development of self-sustainedWUAs.
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First, this statute did not encourage transparency and a participatory role of
farmers in managing WUA activities, but it rather focused on applying control
mechanisms by the Chair of WUA - the legacy of a top-down approach inherited
from a centralized management style was still dominating in this law. One example
is that no oversight mechanisms were delegated to farmers. For instance, the access
to financial accounts by WUA members, and formation of an independent audit
commission were not envisaged.
Second, financial sources ofWUA were designed to be derived from annual
membership fees to solely cover the O&M expenses of on-farm irrigation structures,
whereas the cost of water transportation from reservoirs to WUA's canals was not
foreseen. Thus, farmers continued receiving water free of charge. This accelerated
deterioration of inter-farm irrigation structures as the state budget designed for O&M
of main canals was recovered neither by water users nor by other public revenues.
The strategic issue of cost-recoverywas overlooked in this act.
Third, the issue of equity was poorly reflected in this statute. For instance, the
law authorized individual farmers, farming entities, government agencies, as well as
commercial enterprises to join WUAs. However, the act did not specify principals of
constituting a voting right between various entities. Such arrangement could favor
the dominance of influential stakeholders over weak ones.
Although the law identified that the mediation ofwater disputes to be one of
the core functions of WUA, its clause related to formation of WUA within
administrative borders (but not hydraulic boundaries) was conflicting. This clause
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could have provoked water competition in areas where several WUAs derived water
from a single outlet. No data exist if this clause resulted in water disputes in the
country, but international practice demonstrates that such circumstance evokes
conflicts. Moreover, the function ofmediation of water disputes was solely vested
with the Chair, and no clause foresaw organizational mechanisms to resolve water
conflicts such as establishment ofdispute commission.
2.3.2 Water Pricing Statute (1995)
In January 1995, the President issued a revolutionary decree instituting a
water transportation fee that was subsequently endorsed by the Parliament (pursuant
to Articles 10 & 1 1 of the national Water Code, the Parliament has an exclusive right
to set national water tariffs) (Water Law, 1995). Pursuant to this statute, farmers
were no longer allowed to access water without payment. Thus,
'free-riding'
in using
water by farmers a practice that was exercised by farmers during the entire Soviet
period ~ was ceased.
The water transportation fees were established as shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Water Transportation Tariffs, 1995
Types of
Districts
Fee for non-irrigation season




Fee for irrigation season













0.50 (equivalent to USD0.010) 1.50 (equivalent to
USD0.03)
Source: ParliamentDecree on Water Pricing, 1995
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The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) was
designated to manage the proceeds received from water transportation fee in order
further finance the inter-farm irrigation programs (Government Resolution #113,
1995).
2.3.4 SecondWater Users Association Resolution (1997)
In August 1997, the government enacted the second WUA resolution that
eliminated a number of drawbacks of the preceding law. One of the crucial changes
in this statute was that it promoted establishment of WUAs within hydraulic
boundaries irrespective of administrative borders. The intention of this clause was to
minimize occurrences ofwater conflicts.
The second change was that the law identified mechanisms for water
payments when farmers were expected to pay fees consisting of two components:
i) Water Transportation Fee payable to the MAWR, and ii) O&M fee retained with
the WUA for maintenance of on-farm irrigation infrastructure. The expected annual
collection of theWater Transportation Fee was included in the state budget as public
revenue for use by MAWR for maintenance of inter-farm irrigation systems (WB
Project Information, 2000).
It is important to note that the new law embodied provisions related to water
rights of farmers - conditions and restrictions to access water. In particular, it
stipulated that the amount of water would be subject to the installed capacity of
irrigation structures, and terms ofwater agreements concluded between a farmer and
WUAs. The act also ordained provisions for termination of water rights in cases of
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negligence to pay water fees and ignorance to water an irrigated cropland within two
consecutive years.
Having eliminated a number of inefficiencies of the previous resolution, the
1997 WUA Law became more advanced to foster the development ofWUAs. By the
end of 1999, there were around 90 WUAs established throughout the country;
however, most of them were still weak with limited financial resources. Although,
the law adopted a number of critical changes, this statute did ignore the advancement
of democratic approaches in managing WUA activities. Much power, as in the first
resolution, was still vested with senior managers: all clauses related to the functions
and responsibilities of Chairman remained unchanged in the new statute. Another
factor is that members ofWUAs were still provided with limited rights to participate
in decision-making process.
2.3.5Water Tariff Law (1999)
In view of a low water collection rate and insufficient public funds to
maintain inter-farm I&D schemes, which are still owned by government and
managed by MAWR, the Parliament endorsed a two-fold increase of Water
Transportation Fees as shown in Table 2.3. These rates are still in effect in the
country.
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Table 2.3: Water Transportation Tariff, 1999
Types ofDistricts Fee for non-irrigation season
(I & IV quarters),
SOM per cubic meter
Fee for irrigation season
(II & III quarters),










1.00 (equivalent to USD0.02) 3.00 (equivalent to
USD0.06)
Water payments were authorized to be made by farmers both in cash and in-
kind. The in-kind payment, any crop harvested by a farmer, had not to exceed 30%
of a total contract amount.
2.3.6 Water Users Association Law (2002)
In March 2002, the President ratified a new law onWUAs that is presently in
effect. The law defines WUAs as non-commercial organizations composed of
individual households and farming enterprises. The statute fosters a participatory
approach, transparency, and equity in governing activities ofWUAs. These elements
are mainly targeted to be attained through full and active participation of farmers in a
decision-making process, open financial management, free information sharing,
assurance of equity in water distribution, and open election processes (Government
Resolution # 35, 2002).
The law articulated the scope of rights and liabilities ofWUA members while
such provisions were omitted in previous statutes. In particular, each member is
given a right to elect and be elected to the management board, initiate audit
revisions, and participate in development of annual operational plans and budgets. At
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the same time, the law enforces more stringent procedures. For instance, the act
specifies that a negligence to pay water fees, a failure of a member to comply with
internal rules, or illegal water diversion shall result in the loss of right to access
water.
In order to advance the governance mechanisms, the law introduces structural
changes; it institutes Audit and Dispute Resolution Commissions within the structure
of WUA. The Audit Commission is entitled to inspect financial performance of
WUA. The Dispute Resolution Commission is intended to mediate disputes over
water distribution, and is authorized to impose sanctions provided for by the Charter.
Decisions of the Dispute Commission can be appealed to a court. This ranks the
Dispute Resolution Commission as a full-fledged legitimate body entrusted to settle
disputes.
Another structural change is the exercise of an alternative governing board,
an Assembly of Representatives. This flexibility is introduced to advance the
decision-making process: when a WUA is composed of a large number ofmembers,
the attendance of every member in meetings is hardly possible. For this purpose, the
service area ofWUA is divided into zones, and every zone elects its delegate to the
Assembly ofRepresentatives.
The next significant change is that the law spells out mechanisms establishing
voting rights. A WUA is allowed to exercise
one of the following three principals: i)
every member is entitled to have one vote
irrespective of his/her land size; ii) every
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member shall be entitled a voting right depending on the land size, and iii) a voting
right shall be based on actual payments made by a member.
This law also recommends establishing a Reserve Fund to cover unforeseen
and urgent expenditures such as emergency costs or capital repair expenses
(Government Resolution # 35, 2002).
The legal framework onWUA is considerably reinforced by the enactment of
the new law in 2002. The law captures critical elements needed to ensure political
and financial sustainability of WUAs. The advancement of a legal framework is
undoubtedly the potent input to foster development ofWUAs, but there are a number
of other factors affecting viability of WUAs to fulfill their two major functions:
management of on-farm irrigation structures and assurance of equitable as well as
reliable water distribution. This thesis aims to explore the validity of other factors
such as financial, inter-institutional, operational, and organizational impacting the
viability ofWUAs.
2.4 Conclusion
The irrigation sector in Kyrgyzstan was extensively developed during the
Soviet era; immense investments were made to build irrigation and drainage systems.
However, such constructions were not always of adequate quality while their
maintenance was ineffectively managed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Kyrgyzstan inherited massive irrigation infrastructures, but it lacked public
funds to operate these schemes. Privatization of collective farms, and inability of the
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government to maintain I&D structures had resulted in an institutional gap in
managing the on-farm irrigation systems.
In 1995, the government assigned the farm-based WUAs to ensure the long-
term physical sustainability of on-farm irrigation structures and reliable water
distribution. A number of laws were enacted to promote evolution of WUAs.
However, the lack of government capacity in irrigation management transfer
program, as well as the absence of sound legal instruments resulted in a weak
institutionalization ofWUAs in the country. The laws on WUA enacted late 1990s
and early 2000s have been more progressive in empowering development of
associations. However, there are factors (other than legal framework) impacting
sustainability ofWUAs. This thesis intends to diagnose the operational viability of




The primary goal of the Kyrgyz government in institutionalizing WUAs is to
ensure adequate operation and maintenance ofon-farm I&D structures, and to secure
equitable as well as reliable water supply to farmers. The government intends to
increase the number ofWUAs to about 500 by the year of 2010 so that an entire
national on-farm irrigation system is run byWUAs.
As of early January 2004, there were 342 WUAs functioning in Kyrgyzstan.
They embodied around 595,500 ha out of 1,047,200 ha of total irrigated land, which
represents 57% of total irrigated cropland. The number ofWUAs by provinces varies
as shown in Table 3.1.













Batken 24 57,500 41,000 71%
Jalal-Abad 53 127,800 81,100 63%
Osh 61 134,400 88,600 66%
Issyk-Kul 28 163,400 54,000 33%
Naryn 44 120,200 59,000 49%
Talas 51 114,900 89,500 78%
Chuy 81 328,800 182,300 55%
Total: 342 1,047,000 595,500 57%
Source: WUA Support Unit, WB OIPProject
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Although the number ofWUAs in the country has considerably increased in
comparison with previous years (e.g. there were 223 WUAs in 2000 and 266 in
2001), most of these farm-based organizations are still very far from being
financially self-sustained institutions. One of the supporting evidences is that the
indebtedness of WUAs for Water Transportation Fee payable to government had
reached 42 million Kyrgyz SOM in December 2003, or approximately USD1
million. The average collection rate ofwater fees by provinces, which is presented in
Table 3.2, demonstrates the high insolvency ofWUAs.
Table 3.2: Collection Rate ofWater Fees inWUAs, 2003








Average collection rate by 53%
country
Source: WUA Support Unit, WB OIP Project
It was reported that only 56 out of 342 WUAs (16% out of 100%) were able
to maintain the payment collection rate of 80% or higher in 2003 (WUA Support
Unit, 2004). In general, WUAs retaining collection rates of less than 80% are not
considered to be self-sustained agencies. It can be implied that a large percentage of
WUAs is encountering insolvency.
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To determine factors influencing development of WUAs, this thesis
diagnoses the performance of two groups ofWUAs: i) advanced ('A') and poorly
developed ('PD'). The first group was composed of WUAs that have achieved
certain financial and operational progress according to the WB's "On-Farm
Irrigation
Project"
(Project) in Kyrgyzstan. The second group consisted of WUAs
that did not achieve the WB's benchmark of success. The Project applies this
benchmark to select successful WUAs for possible loans to rehabilitate the on-farm
irrigation structures. The Project assesses WUAs as per the following seven-stage




stage : Incorporation ofWUA
2n
stage: Recruitment ofpersonnel and their training by OIP
3rd
stage: Development of short- and long - term operational plans, and
their endorsement byWUAmembers
4th
stage: Full settlement ofwater transportation and O&M fees
5th
stage: Development of operational plan for rehabilitation of
irrigation structures
6th
& 7 stages: Endorsement of Operational Rehabilitation Plan by all
members ofWUA.
The literature review of irrigation management transfer programs in other
countries showed that there is no unique methodology to assess the performance of
WUAs. Having summarized numerous existing approaches, a model composed of
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five indicative measurements - legal, financial, operational, organizational, and
inter-institutional ~ was designed for this research. The basic idea of this model is
that the rule of law {legal factor), management of financial resources (financial),
operation and maintenance of irrigation structures {operational), internal
organizational and structural management {organizational) and external
communication {inter-institutional) constitute the core functional components of
WUAs. A failure to perform well in these areas prevents WUAs to be operationally
viable and self-sustaining.
Thus, the aim of this research is to compare performances of two types of
WUAs ~ the advanced and poorly developed
~ in five indicative areas, and
determine factors influencing most the development ofWUAs. Specific hypotheses
for each indicative area are presented later.
3.2 Research Approach
Measurement sub-criteria for five indicative areas (legal, operational,
financial, organizational and inter-institutional) were designed to assess the
performance of two groups ofWUAs in each of these domains. The first criterion
tests ifprocedures are set up and rules are enforced in WUAs so that water is timely
and equitably distributed to farmers. The financial performance criterion explores the
efficiency of financial management techniques practiced in WUAs. The third
measurement (operational) investigates if arrangements are established in WUAs to
adequately operate and maintain irrigation structures. The next criterion is the
organizational factor that explores the functionality of internal structural
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arrangements. The last indicator is the inter-institutional sub-criterion that tests the
level of government support and responsiveness to WUA's needs and concerns.
These measurement criteria and their sub-criteria are demonstrated in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Measurement Criteria
i) LegalPerformance
DETERMINANT OBJECTIVE
Clarity To determine ifthere are clear rules about who has right
to water
Equity To define ifrules ensure that each member 's
contributions and benefits are in balance




To identify ifviolators ofrules receive graduated










To diagnose the adequacy ofO&Mfee level
Timeliness of Fees
Collection




To investigate theproportion ofcash and in-kind




To explore the availability ofa Reserve Fundwith WUAs





O&M Plan To diagnoseprogress in implementation ofO&Mplans
Rehabilitation Plan To examine ifWUAs undertook rehabilitation works








Conflict Resolution To explore ifarrangements exist to mediate water disputes
Audit To determine ifarrangements are set up to conduct audits
Transparency To explore the availability of information about activities
and decisions ofWUAs tofarmers




Decentralization To determine the level of independence of WUAs from
external agencies in managing activities
Responsiveness To explore the level ofresponsiveness ofgovernment water
agency/WUA Support Unit to the concerns and
suggestions ofWUAs
Quality To research if quality of services provided by WUA
Support Unit satisfies WUAs
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Two types of questionnaires were developed to measure these performance
indicators. The first questionnaire was designed for members ofWUAs that assessed
farmers as the clients of irrigation services provided byWUAs. The second form was
developed for managers of WUAs to largely evaluate the scope and quality of
managerial endeavors. The questionnaires are attached as Appendix I and // in this
thesis. The questions in these two forms address all five indicative areas.
Formal meetings and discussions with experts from government water
agencies, WB, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) implementing WUA-related
initiatives in Kyrgyzstan were held to collect additional data.
3.3 Data Collection
The interviewer undertook a field research trip to Kyrgyzstan from December
12, 2003 to January 4, 2004 in order to complete questionnaires and conduct
personal meetings.
In total, six WUAs (3 WUAs in the
'A'
group and 3 in the 'PD') were
evaluated. Four of the WUAs were located in Chuy Province, the northern part of
Kyrgyzstan, and the remaining two in Osh Province, the southern region of the
country. Details of theseWUAs are presented in Table 3.4.
37
Table 3.4: Description ofWUAs Selected for Research
Advanced WUAs Location Stage of
Development
Japalak Kara-Suu District, Osh Province BeyondT
Milyanfan Kant District, Chuy Province BeyondT
Uzyn-Kyr Issyk-Ata District, Chuy Province BeyondT
Poorly Developed
WUAs
Kerme-Too Ak-Buura Aravan District, Osh Province
4th
stage
Eldik Kemin District, Chuy Province
4th
stage
Ak-Bar Suu Kant District, Chuy Province
4th
stage
Overall, 1 manager (Director ofWUA) of each WUA and 39 farmers from
each group were interviewed. Farmers for the interviews were identified in two
ways. The first method is that the interviewer was visiting houses and offices of
water users by random selection. In one or two cases, a few water users among a
total number of interviewees from one association were called upon by managers.
However, the later mode did not prevail. While selecting water users for interviews,
no focus was made on social status, professional background, age or gender ofwater
users. This thesis does not focus on social determinants, but it rather concentrates on
operational features ofWUA as an institution.
Chapter 4 presents the results of surveys and their analysis.
3.4 Conclusion
Literature explaining the worldwide
irrigation management transfer programs
was reviewed to identify the methodology for assessment of the performance of
WUAs. The literature review showed that there is no one standard method for the
performance evaluation. Having summarized various methods, the five indicative
areas - legal, financial, operational, organizational, and inter-institutional
~ were
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identified as the measurement standards for this research. It is assumed that these
areas represent the core operational domains ofWUAs, and the assessment of these
areas would be sufficient to identify the development ofWUAs.
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Chapter 4: Research Results
4.1 Structure of the Data Analysis





associations are grouped into five indicative sections as presented earlier in
Table 3.3. Each section starts with a description of the main criteria; sub-sections
then describe the sub-criteria used to measure the respective performance. Each sub
section presents the questions asked from the survey, survey responses, and





groups in a respective indicative area, and explaining the causes
of deficiencies. Recommendations to address these inefficiencies will be presented in
the Chapter 5.
The first domain to discuss is the legal performance.
4.2 Legal Performance
The rule of law is one of the critical governance elements required to ensure
efficient operation of an organization. The failure of a WUA to enforce the law
might defer the attainment of required outputs, result in water disputes and conflicts
(especially in areas where water is scarce and farming is fully dependent on
irrigation), and lead to inequity in water distribution among farmers.
The legal performance criterion explores whether procedures are set up and
rules are enforced in WUAs to produce timely and equitable water distribution
among farmers. Sub-criteria under legal
performance include: (i) Clarity ofRules,
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(ii) Equity in Water Use, (Hi) Timeliness of Water Supply, and (iv) Compliance with
Rules andRegulations.
The working hypothesis for the legal performance is that the rules and




group. The hypothesis for
each sub-criterion is that the
'A'




Purpose: To determine if there are clear rules in WUAs about who has right
to water (Note: The absence of clear community rules specifying procedures for
water use originates inefficiencies such as inequity in water use or prevalence of
individually established rules).




important factors, among the given indicators, determining your
limitsfor water use". The given list of factors included: i) Payment ofwater fees; ii)
Use of more water by upstream farmers; Hi) Water scarcity; iv) Water schedule
established by WUA, and v) Size ofland.
Responses to 01: Responses of farmers from both groups are shown in
Table 4.1.
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Payment ofwater fees 25 10 25 25
Water use between upstream
and downstream farmers
8 28 20 13
Water scarcity 41 34 3 3
Water schedule 26 23 6 23
Size ofLand 0 5 46 36
Data Interpretation: Based on figures in Table 4.1, it is assumed that water
scarcity and watering schedule limit water use in both groups. However, the
difference is that payment ofwaterfees is regarded as more critical factor in the
'A'
group than in the
'PD'
associations. In view of this, one might suspect that rules
concerning water payment are well enforced in the
'A'
rather than in the
'PD'
group:





fact, farmers from one advanced association declared that water is not released to
their farms until 30% of their water fees is paid. Meanwhile, the negligence to settle
water payment did not affect the volume ofwater use in the
'PD'
group, as observed
during a field trip. Farmers in all the
'PD'
associations were supplied with water
irrespective of water payments; there were many examples when farmers had not
settled theirwater fees formore than a year.
Another important difference is that water distribution between upstream and




group. It is implied that there exist no well-governed procedures regarding water






group: upstream farmers unfairly use more water than
downstream members. When such rules are absent or weakly instituted, water
disputes and delays in water supply normally emerge. This judgment was
corroborated during the on-site travel; downstream farmers complained that
upstream farmers were normally given priority in watering. As a result, there were
recurrent disputes among farmers over water distribution.
As far as the least important factor is concerned,payment ofwaterfees is also
categorized as the second least important factor in the
'A'
group; around 25% of
farmers responded so. This indicates that not all farmers in the
'A'
group are well
disciplined for failure to pay water fees.
Overall, it can be concluded that rules defining water rights (water use) are






Purpose: To identify whether rules ensure that each member's contributions
and benefits are in balance. (Note: Rules should ensure that nofarmer or a group of
farmers have unfair advantage in water use).
Question 2: Farmers were asked: Do you think that some members ofyour
WUA are given more rightsfor water use than you are?
Responses to 02: Figure 4.1 presents answers of farmers to Question 2.
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Question 3: Farmers who replied
"Yes"
in both groups were asked: Please
identify which WUA members, among the given list, have more rights for water use.
The given list included: i) Large peasantfarms vs. small households; ii) WUA senior
members; Hi) Wealthy farmers; iv) Bribery-givers; and v) Those who timely settle
theirwaterpayments.
Responses to 03: Table 4.2 presents answers of farmers from both groups.













Large peasant farms vs.
small households 10 28 8 56
WUA seniormembers 10 28 8 56
Wealthy farmers 23 15 62 2
Bribery-givers 28 10 64 0
Those who timely settle
their water payments 18 20 5 59
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Data Interpretation: As shown in Figure 4.1, around 38% of members in
the
'A'
group stated that some members of their WUAs enjoyed more privileges in
using water than other farmers, and this figure doubled to 64% in the
'PD'
group.
Water users in both groups, with a much higher percentage in the
'PD'
associations, identified that wealthy farmers and bribery-givers have more rights
than other members in consuming water. In interviews, farmers from the
'PD'
associations stated that ditch-riders, a staff hired by WUA to control water
distribution, are frequently bribed to allocate water out of the schedule. As shown in
Table 4.2, cases of bribery also occur in the
'A'
group but with a lesser degree than
in the
'PD'
group. It is conceived that rent-seeking (taking bribery) is a very
common practice inWUAs, but during interviews farmers did not regard bribery as a
significant problem to be attacked.
Farms ofwealthy members are mostly located at the upstream level, and they
had more priorities in watering than other farmers did, as shown in Table 4.2.
Descriptions of the foregoing and next sub-sections discuss and support this
judgment.
It is concluded that the absence and/or weak enforcement of the rule of law
resulted in inequitable water use in both groups; some influential and powerful
members unfairly benefited more in water use than
other farmers did. Hence, it can
be inferred that the rules ensuring each member's contribution and benefits are





Purpose: To identify ifwater is supplied to farmers in a timelymanner.
Question 4: Farmers were asked: Is water supplied in a timely manner to
yourfarm, i.e. asper the schedule developed by WUA?
Responses to Q4: Responses of farmers are shown in Figure 4.2.




Strictly as per Delays seldom Delays regularly Delays always
schedule occur occur occur




factors, among the given list, causing delays in water delivery. List of
factors included: i) Natural level ofwater is low; ii). Upstream farmers are given
priority in watering; Hi) Wealthyfarmers are given priority; iv) Leaders ofWUA are
given priority; v) Water is illegally diverted by some WUA members; vi) Bribery
occur to water out of schedule, and vii) Poor control ofwater schedule by
ditch-
riders.
Responses to Q5: Farmers from two groups replied as shown in Table 4.3.
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Natural level ofwater is low 43 26 23 20
Upper farmers are given priority in
watering
8 20 16 18
Poor condition of irrigation systems 16 8 26 8
Wealthy farms water out oforder 5 13 2 16
WUA leaders are given priority in
watering
0 0 0 0
Water is illegally diverted by some
farmers
10 18 10 20
Bribery occurs to water out of the
schedule
10 10 10 14
Weak control over water schedule 8 5 13 4
Data Interpretation: Figure 4.2 demonstrates that farmers experience delays
in receiving water in both groups, with a very high percentage of occurrences in the
'PD'
group. Natural low level ofwater was ranked in both groups as the most salient
factor causing delays in water supply. WUAs in the
'A'
group regarded poor
condition of irrigation structures as the second
critical problem. Water distribution
between upstream and downstreamfarmers and weak control over water schedule by
ditch-riders were also highly scored in the
'A'
group. However, farmers in the
'PD'
group weighted water distribution between
upstream and downstream users, illegal
diversion ofwater, and out-of-schedule watering by wealthy farmers as the critical
causes originating water delays. Poor condition of
irrigation schemes was not highly
ranked in the
'PD'
group as it was the case in the
'A'
group.
A conclusion can be drawn from these survey results that a very high






a situation is likely conditioned, in addition to a natural low level of surface water,
by the absence or inefficient administration of internal procedures regarding water
distribution. Consequently, inefficient law enforcement results in illegal water
diversion, watering out of schedule, use of rent-seeking, and inequitable water
distribution between upstream and downstream farmers. As a result of these factors,
the delayed and unsteady water supply to farmers occurs that threatens agricultural
production (especially for downstream farmers), and raises water disputes.
4.2.4 Compliance with Rules
Purpose: To identify if violators of rules receive graduated penalties decided
by other users or by people accountable to them. (Note: There should be rules
ensuring obedience ofall water users to theprocedures ofWUA).
Question 6: Farmers were asked: Are violators of rules and regulations
penalized?
Responses to Q6: Responses of farmers are displayed in Figure 4.3.
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Yes, I think they are
penalized
No, they are not always They are not penalized at
penalized all
Question 7: Those farmers who replied "No, they are not always
and "No, they are not penalized at
all"
in Question # 6 were asked: Please indicate
the main reason, among the given list, why you think that violators are notpenalized.
The given factors included: i) Penalties are rarely imposed; ii) Penalties exist but
farmers use bribery to avoidpenalties; Hi) Violators are not always caught, and iv)
Penalties are not strict enough.
Responses to 07: Responses of farmers are reflected in Figure 4.4.
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Penalties are Penalties exist but Violators are not Penalties are not
rarely imposed farmers use always caught strict enough
bribery to avoid
penalties





groups; a considerably high percentage of
interviewees in the
'PD'
group (39%) responded that violators are not penalized at
all.
The responses to questions # 6 and 7 imply that rules are better enforced in
the
'A'
group, where farmers are more aware of the regulations and seek rules to be
more stringent. Meanwhile, a very high percentage ofwater users in the
'PD'
group
declared that violators are never penalized or penalties are rarely imposed in their
WUAs. Hence, the inference can be made that rules either are absent or very poorly
instituted in the
'PD'





group can be first attributable to the
unawareness ofwater
users about existence of such rules and procedures. Yet, if rules exist, the lack of
enforcement elements such as penalties or their weak imposition can condition
inefficacy in the rule of law. Weak social responsibility,
which measures
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participation, responsiveness and accountability of community members in
promoting the rule of law, can be another contributor to this problem.
4.2.6 Conclusion
To make an overall assessment of the legal performance of both groups, the
scoring system measuring the performance of each sub-criterion is used. In this
scoring system, excellent performance of sub-criterion is marked as "5", good
performance as "4", satisfactory performance as
"3"
', poor performance as "2", and
verypoor performance as "1". This scoring scheme is also applied for evaluation of
other indicative areas.
Table 4.4 presents an overall scoring of legal performance ofboth groups.






Compliance with Rules 3 2
Ownership of I&D structures 5 4
Based on the scoring scale presented in Table 4.4, a conclusion can be drawn





Hence, farmers in the
'PD'
group are more exposed to unreliability and unsteadiness
in water supply. Ineffective law enforcement also creates inequity in water
distribution that results in imbalance of contributions and benefits to farmers, and the
prevalence of some influential farmers in water use. Instead of relying on community
rules, the absence of rule of the law forces water users in the
'PD'
group to create
their own rules. As a result, negative externalities such as rent-seeking and illegal
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water diversions prevail in the PD group. Moreover, poor administration of the rules
led to the loss of integrity in managing this common resource (water) and provoked
recurrent disputes over water distribution in the
'PD'
group.
Another salient factor is that the transaction costs of farmers - namely, time
spent to receive water - are higher for farmers in the
'PD'
group. Farmers
complained that they frequently needed to watch after their upstream neighbors not
to divert water.
It should be noted that the radius of the rule of law is not limited to the
domains discussed in this section, but it is the essential component of all indicative
areas ofWUA, which are examined in the next sections.
4.3 Financial Performance
The lack of public funds to operate and maintain the on-farm I&D structures
had led to an initiation of an irrigation management transfer program in Kyrgyzstan.
One of the main goals in institutionalizingWUAs is to ensure the long-term physical
sustainability of I&D structures. It is obvious that this objective would not be
attainable without financial self-reliance ofWUAs.
The financial performance criterion intends to explore the financial operation
and practices of WUAs. The following six sub-criteria are used to measure this
performance: i) Collection ofWater and O&M Fees, ii) Adequacy ofWater Fees, Hi)
Timeliness ofFee Collection, iv) Cash vs. In-kind Payment, v) Reserve Fund, and vi)
Access to Loans.
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The working hypothesis is that WUAs in the
'A'
group are financially more
self-sustained than the
'PD'
associations. The hypothesis for every sub-criterion is
that the
'A'
group is performing better than the
'PD'
group.
4.3.1 Collection ofWater and O&M Fee
Purpose: To determine the collection rate (the level of water fees collected)
ofwater payments inWUAs. (Note: Ifamount ofwaterfees collected is less than the
required level, it mayjeopardize implementation ofO&Mplans).
Question 10: Managers were asked: What was the collection rate ofwater
payments (including cash and in-kind contributions) in your WUA in 2003?





associations are shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Payment Collection Rate (periodfrom 1/20/03 to 12/20/03)
'A'




























Question 11: Managers were asked: Were the collection rates higher in 2003
than in previous years?
Responses to Oil: Managers from both groups replied as shown in
Table 4.6.
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Collection rate increased in 2003 3
Collection rate remained unchanged in 2003 3
Question 12: Managers who positively responded (only managers from
'A'
group), were asked: Please indicate the main reason, among the given list, that
affected most the higher collection rate in 2003? The list of indicators included:
i) Agricultural proceeds of WUA members were higher in 2003 compared with
previous years; ii) Water users became more aware of the importance to maintain
irrigation schemes; Hi) Penalty system became more stringent that changed the
attitude of WUA members; iv) Overall financial management system was improved
in WUA (better tracking system or new accounting techniques).
Responses to Q12: Managers from
'A'
group replied as shown in Table 4.7.







Income of farmers was higher in 2003 compared with previous
years
Farmers became more aware of the importance to O&M
irrigation schemes
1
Financial management ofWUA was improved {better tracking
system or new accounting techniques)
Penalties became stricter that changed the attitude ofWUA
members
1
Data Interpretation: Pursuant to the national law on WUA, associations are
supposed to collect two types of fees: i) Water Transportation Fee payable to the
government for water transportation, and ii) an O&M fee retained by the WUAs to
cover its internal operational and administrative expenses (WUA Law, 2002). These
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two fees are collected from farmers as a single payment. Farmers are allowed to
make payments in cash and in-kind (crops).
As shown in Table 4.5, the overall collection rate in 2003 was not high in




groups respectively). There is a general perception that WUAs are not financially
stable when their fee collection rate is less than 80% (WB Project Information,
1999). There was only one WUA in the
'A'
group capable to reach 80% collection
rate. Furthermore, there was one WUA in the
'PD'
group that experienced zero
collection of fees. A manager from this WUA stated in the interview that a District
WaterAgency, a wholesale supplier ofwater to WUA, had filed a case with the local
court against the WUA for high debts in water transportation fees; the debts were
accrued from previous years. The Court ordered this WUA to settle payments by
earlyDecember 2003, but theWUA failed to pay off its debts. The failure of farmers
to make water payments resulted in financial insolvency of theWUA.
Table 4.6 demonstrates that the collection rate in the
'PD'
group remained
unchanged, but it increased in the
*A'
group. As shown in Table 4.7, better
awareness offarmers about the importance to maintain irrigation structures and
enforcement of stringent penalties were identified by WUAs in the
'A'
group as
critical factors that improved the collection rate. Meanwhile, a manager from one
WUA in the
'A'
group pointed out that the smaller
amount of rainfall that occurred
during the growing season in 2003 had attributed to a higher amount of fees
collected. The manager explained that a low precipitation level during the growing
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season increases the demand for irrigated water. Accordingly, a drier growing season
in 2003 elevated the demand for irrigated water in this WUA, where the O&M fee
was calculated based on the volume of water supplied to farmers. Thus, a higher
volume of water provided to the farmers in 2003 had resulted in a higher amount of
fees due in payment by farmers.
This calculation mode is problematic as it generates financial instability for
WUAs; the instability is caused by a strong reliance of the O&M fee on the
precipitation rates. Such a situation happened in Kyrgyzstan in previous years when
the high precipitation rates attributed to the budget insolvency of many WUAs
practicing such a calculation method. Instead, the O&M fee should be regarded as a
fixed charge to be paid by farmers irrespective of water volume supplied. It is the
Water Transportation Fee that should be subject to a volumetric charge.
Conclusions can be drawn that the collection rate ofwater payments is lower
in the
'PD'
associations than in the
'A'
group. However, the average collection rate
in the
'A'
group is not high. The situation encountered in both groups raises serious
concerns over financial sustainability of WUAs and their ability to manage I&D
structures. If the financial situation of WUAs does not improve, deterioration of
irrigation structures might expand.
4.3.2 Adequacy ofWater Fees
Purpose: To explore if the level of O&M fee established by WUAs was
sufficient to cover operational expenses (O&M and administrative expenses). (Note:
56
The level ofa waterfee should enable WUA to cover operational expenses provided
that collection ofwaterfees is high).
Question 13: Managers ofWUAs were asked: Did the level ofwaterfees set
in 2003 allowyour WUA tofully cover operational costs?
Responses to Q13: Responses ofmanagers are shown in Table 4.8.









It allowed to fully cover operational
expenses
It allowed to partially cover operational
expenses 3 WUAs, or 100% 3 WUAs, or 100%
No, it did not allow to cover even partial
operational expenses
Question 14: Managers were asked: How much percentage ofyour WUA
budget is spentforpayroll expenses?
Responses to Q14: Managers responded as shown in Table 4.9.















Data Interpretation: As shown in Table 4.8, all WUAs in both groups
responded that the fee level set for 2003 allowed WUAs to partially cover their
operational expenses. In addition to this deficiency, it was revealed that half of the
budget expenses ofmany WUAs, as exhibited in Table 4.9, are solely disbursed for
payroll expenses. A substantial portion of the budget resources spent for payroll
costs calls in question the sufficiency of funds allotted for O&M
works.
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Moreover, the consultants ofWB have estimated that approximately US$10
per hectare (ha) needs to be incurred to sustain on-farm I&D structures (WB Project
Information, 2000). However, at best WUAs are presently collecting less than
US$1.0 per ha.
It can be concluded that a level of water fees was inadequately set in both
groups. As a result, WUAs were able to partially cover operational expenses, as
shown in Table 4.8.
4.3.3 Timeliness of Fee Collection
Purpose: To determine ifwater fees are paid by farmers in a timely fashion.
(Note: Delays in water payments restricts the ability of WUA to carry out the
required level ofO&Mworks).
Question 15: Managers were asked: Do members of your WUA make
payments (cash and in kind) with delays?
Responses to Q15: Responses ofmanagers are shown in Table 4.10.









Water payments are rarely paid with delays
Water payments are mostly paid with delays 3, or 100% 3, or 100%
Water payments are always paid with delays
Question 16: Managers were asked: Are penalties charged for delayed
payments?
Responses to Q16: Managers responded as shown in Table 4.11.
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Penalties are imposed for delays in payment 2 1
Penalties are not imposed for delays in payment 1 2
Data interpretation: As shown in Table 4.10, delays in water payments are





group, as demonstrated in Table 4.11. Yet discussions
with managers from both groups disclosed that the penalty system is not practiced
efficiently yet: penalties are not systematically imposed, or the ignorance of farmers
to pay penalties is frequently encountered. Managers explained that their WUAs are
unable to attack the negligence ofwater users to pay penalties.
It is conceived that the inability ofWUAs to address the neglect of farmers to
pay penalties results from the lack of power ofWUAs to enforce the rules. It seems
that farmers do not regard the WUA as an institution wielding any authority. Such an
attitude might be attributable to the absence of a community decision to delegate a
WUA with a power to manage water-related activities.
The low farming income is another significant problem halting a timely
collection ofwater fees. In interviews, farmers from both groups identified the low
income level as the underlining factor preventing them to make water payments in a
timely and full manner.
It can be concluded that both groups experience delays in water payments






group. Yet, the penalty system exercised for the delayed
payments is seemingly ineffective in both groups.
4.3.4 Cash vs. In-kind Payment
Purpose: To investigate the proportion of cash and in-kind payments made in
WUAs, and explore complications imposed by the in-kind contributions. (Note: The
high rate of in-kind contributions (crops) might restrict availability of budget
resources ofWUAs).
Question 17: Managers were asked: Whatpercentage ofwaterpayments was
made in kind in your WUA in 2003?
Responses to Q17: Managers responded as shown in Table 4.12.




WUA 'A', % 'PD', %
1st
WUA 93 60
2nd WUA 70 60
3rd WUA 60 60
Data Interpretation: The national law stipulates that in-kind contributions
should not exceed 30% of the total amount of water payment (WUA Law, 2002).
However, Table 4.12 shows that the percentage of in-kind payments made in both
groups was higher than the established 30% baseline. The percentage of the in-kind




group; for one WUA in the
'A'
group 93% ofpayments were made in-kind.
Managers from both groups admitted that the inability of farmers to make
cash payments forces WUAs to accept the in-kind contributions. A statement was
also made that the refusal ofWUAs to accept the in-kind contributions from farmers
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might result in farmers not making any payment. Therefore, WUAs exceeded a
thirty-percent baseline.
Managers of both groups declared that there are a number of complications
originated from the in-kind contributions. First, it restricts cashflow in WUAs while
payments to contractors are to be settled in cash. Second, transaction costs are very
high: the storage and transportation of crops should be arranged in order sell crops at
markets or deliver crops to a District Water Agency to barter for the Water
Transportation Fees. A third factor is the difference between the purchase price of
crops accepted from farmers and the sale price of crops sold atmarket: if sale price is
lower than a purchase price, the difference is to be reimbursed from the budget of
WUAs.
It seems that it is much easier for farmers to make payment in in-kind, and
therefore, they still prefer practicing this payment mode.





groups that is against the hypothesis made for this
sub-criterion. The major complications originated from the in-kind payment are the
restricted cashflow, high transaction costs, and a risk to incur extra expenditures
because of the difference in purchase and sale prices of crops.
4.3.5 Reserve Fund
Purpose: To explore the availability of the Reserve Fund. (Note: The
Reserve Fund is designed to cover emergency and unforeseen expenses ofWUAs).
Question 18: Managers were asked: Does your WUA have a Reserve Fund?
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Responses to Q18: Managers responded as shown in Figure 4.5.










Data Interpretation: None of WUAs had operated the Reserve Fund in
2003, as shown in Figure 4.5. The budget insolvency restricted the ability ofWUAs
to establish the Reserve Fund.
4.3.6 Access to Loans
Purpose: To examine ifWUAs are in a position to apply for loans from local
banks. (Note: The access to external funding including loans from local banks can
help WUAs to have access tofinancial resources).
Question 19: Managers were asked: Do you intend to applyfor loanfrom the
local banks?
Responses to 019: Responses ofmanagers are shown in Figure 4.6.
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Data Interpretation: Given the fact that internal financial resources of
WUAs might not be sufficient to cover O&M and rehabilitation costs, access to
loans from local banks could be important. However, the high interest rates charged
by local banks (APR: 20-25% for loans in USD) disableWUAs from access to loans
from local banks (Bisnis, 2003).
4.3.7 Conclusion
The foregoing sub-criteria measuring the financial performance ofWUAs in
the two groups have been scored as shown in Table 4.13.
Table 4.13: Financial Performance Scoring
Sub-criteria
'A' 'PD'
Collection ofWater and O&M Fee 4 2
Adequacy ofWater Fees 2 2
Timeliness ofFee Collection 2 2
Cash vs. In-kind Payment 2 3
Reserve Fund 2 2
When both groups are contrasted, the
'A'
group is slightly performing better
than the
'PD'
group; 'A's collection rate is higher and increased in 2003 compared
with 2002. The survey results and interviews held reveal that the rise in collection
63
rate is largely attributable to the imposition ofpenalties for late payments and raising
awareness of farmers about the indispensability to maintain irrigation structures.
However, both groups are not financially sustainable yet, with the
'PD'
group
showing a greater financial burden. Both groups experienced a high indebtedness of
water fees, delayed payments, inadequacy of water fees, dominance of the in-kind





collection of fees, and was sued by a
District Water Agency for its indebtedness. Such financial insolvency raises serious
concerns over the future operational viability ofWUAs. Financial insolvency is not
only conditioned by a minimal farming income as reported by farmers, but also a
result of poor financial management practices exercised in WUAs. It is the
responsibility ofWUAs to improve their internal financial practices.
The research results imply that WUAs suffer from limited authority to
effectively enforce rules. This situation stems from the absence of a community
agreement to delegate a WUA with the power to execute the irrigation management
activities. Poor social responsibility, which measures participation, responsiveness
and accountability of community members to promote the rule of law, also hinders
efficient enforcement of rules.
Moreover, WUAs are lacking appropriate financial management practices
such as proper calculation of the O&M fees. The O&M fee is currently the sole
revenue source ofWUAs. However, some WUAs in both groups regard the O&M
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fee as a volumetric charge but not as a fixed cost intended to cover internal
operational and administrative expenses.
Another inefficient financial management practice is a high percentage of the
in-kind contributions. The high rate of in-kind contributions generates high
transaction costs, disbursement of extra expenses (storage and transportation
expenditures) and limits the cashflow ofWUAs.
Successful operation of WUAs will largely depend on their financial
sustainability that cannot be attained without eliminating problems discussed in this
section. Chapter 5 presents policy recommendations to attack these problems.
4.4 Operational Performance
The operational performance criterion intends to explore progress made by
WUAs in ensuring adequate operation and maintenance of irrigation structures. Four
measurement criteria are used to assess this performance, and they are: Operation &
Maintenance (O&M) Plan, Rehabilitation Plan, Machinery Stock and Ownership of
I&D.
The working hypothesis is that the I&D structures are well operated and
maintained in the
'A'
rather than in the
'PD'
group. The hypothesis for each sub-
criterion is that the advanced associations are performing better than WUAs in the
'PD'
group.
4.4.1 Operation & Maintenance (O&M) Plan
Purpose: To explore if WUAs developed short-term and long-term O&M
plans, and to diagnose progress made in implementation of short-term plans. (Note:
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Short and long-term O&M plans are needed to prioritize O&M works and secure
fundingfor implementation oftheseplans).
Question 20: Managers were asked: Does your WUA have a short-term
operationalplan ?





associations are shown in Figure 4.7.












Question 21: Managers were asked: Does your WUA have a long-term
operationalplan ?
Response to Q21: Managers responded as demonstrated in Figure 4.8.










Question 22: Managers were asked: Overall, what percentage ofyour OP
was implemented as ofearlyDecember 2003?
Response to Q22: Responses ofmanagers are shown in Table 4.14.








3rd WUA 98 70
Question 23: Managers were asked: What factors hindered implementation
ofyour OP? The list of factors included: i) Low collection ofO&Mfees from WUA
members; ii) Lack ofproper machinery & equipment to maintain irrigation schemes;
Hi) Setting up a lower level ofO&Mfee; iv) Poor support from WUA members to
undertake routine O&Mworks; v) Lack ofexpertise to develop a proper OP; and vi)
Lack ofsupportfrom theDistrict WUA Support Unit to develop operationalplan.
Response to Q23: Managers responded as shown in Table 4.15.




















Lack of funds 3 WUAs 3 WUAs
Lack of technical expertise to properly
develop OP
Lack of support from farmers to
undertake routine works
Lack of assistance fromWUA Support
Unit to develop operational plan
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Data Interpretation: As shown in Figure 4.7 and 4.8, both groups developed
short and long term O&M plans. The long-term operational plans of all associations
are valid until the year of2005.
Progress in implementation of short-term O&M plans varies in the two
groups; the
'A'
group succeeded more than the
'PD'
group. However, managers of
WUAs in both groups admitted that the scope of their O&M plans constituted a very
minimum of all required works. Minor routine works such as manual andmechanical
cleansing of ditches and canals considerably compose the O&M plans of both
groups. As informed by managers, no large maintenance works were carried out by
WUAs in 2003. Managers of two advanced associations also stated that the cleansing
of drainage systems (drainage collectors) have not been undertaken in their WUAs
for around 15 years (it is required to have drainage collectors cleaned once every
three to five years). Managers also pointed out that poor operation of drainage
systems causes waterlogging of soil in their locations.
Lack offunds was ranked by both groups, as demonstrated in Table 4.15, as
the primary problem of inadequate O&M. Lack of required machinery and
equipmentwas identified as the next critical factor by both groups.
All managers admitted that gradual expansion ofO&M works is foreseen for
the coming years, but the likelihood of their
implementation is strongly doubtful by
them given the low collection rate ofwater payments and very high O&M costs.
It can be concluded that advanced associations are performing better than the
'PD'
group in implementation of O&M plans. However, minimum maintenance
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work for irrigation structures in both groups arouses serious concerns about the
future functionality of I&D structures.
4.4.2 Rehabilitation Plan
Purpose: To examine ifWUAs undertook rehabilitation works at their own
expenses {Note: WUAs need to have sufficient internal funds to rehabilitate I&D
structures as an external supportfrom the government is notforeseen).
Question 24: Managers were asked: Did your WUA undertake any
rehabilitation works in previous years at expenses of WUA (without external
financial assistance)?









Data interpretation: As demonstrated in Figure 4.9, none ofWUAs made
rehabilitation works in previous years at their own expense. In fact, the rehabilitation
works have commenced in two WUAs from the
'A'
group under a loan agreement
with theWB-funded On-Farm Irrigation Project and the ADB-financedAgricultural
Area Development Project. The third WUA in the
'A'
group was pre-screened for
receipt of loans. The WUAs borrowing loans need to repay 25% of the total loan
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amount, while the remaining 75% is paid by the Kyrgyz government. Managers from
the
'A'
group claimed that it would not have been possible for their WUAs to fund
rehabilitation works without external financial support.
No restoration and construction works were undertaken in the
'PD'
group. In
the course of interviews, managers of this group reported that they are competing
against other WUAs to obtain loans from the WB or ADB offering beneficial
repayment terms. They also reported that the failure to obtain loans from these two
financial institutions would result in the failure of their WUAs to sustain I&D
structures. Managers in two groups regard the WB's and ADB's loans as the sole
way to restore their I&D systems. Yet, the funds of the ADB and WB Projects
designed for rehabilitation works are limited. In total, the ADB and WB Projects
intend to cover around 215,000 ha of irrigated land. Meanwhile, an approximate
additional 317,000 ha of irrigated land require rehabilitation works in the country.
Around 160 WUAs are located at this land area (WUA Support Unit, 2004).
4.4.3 Machinery Stock
Purpose: To examine ifWUAs have machinery and equipment to maintain
irrigation structures. (Note: The lack of machinery and equipment to maintain
irrigation structures mightjeopardize the accomplishment ofO&Mworks).
Question 25: Managers were asked: Do you have machinery and equipment
to undertake O&M?
Responses to Q25: Responses ofmanagers are shown in Figure 4.10.
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Data Interpretation: Figure 4.10 and a field visit show that WUAs are
lacking equipment andmachinery to maintain I&D structures. The current practice in
both groups is thatWUAs rent machines from farmers or external contractors. Rental
for machines from local farmers is credited towards their water payment. District
Water Agencies inherited excavators and other equipment from former Soviet water
departments, and it exploits this equipment, which is mostly outdated, for
maintenance of inter-farm canals. However, there is no practice for the District
WaterAgencies renting its equipment toWUAs.
4.2.5 Ownership of Irrigation Structures
Purpose: To explore if irrigation structures were transferred to the ownership
ofWUAs. (Note: Pursuant to the national bylaws, irrigation structures should be
owned by WUA, and thus, old holders should transfer irrigation structures to the
ownership ofWUA).
Question 8: Managers were asked: Were the irrigation structures transferred
to the ownership ofyour WUA?
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reflected in Figure 4.11.









Question 9: Farmers were asked: Which agency do you think is the owner of
irrigation schemes exploited in your WUA?
Responses to Q9: Responses of farmers are shown in Table 4.16:







Village Council V 8




Data Interpretation: Pursuant to a number of government resolutions, the
on-farm irrigation structures had to be transferred to the ownership of WUAs. As
shown in Figure 4.1 1, all six associations currently own I&D structures.
As far as the awareness of farmers about this ownership is concerned, it was
revealed that all farmers in the
'A'
group knew that their WUAs own I&D systems.
It is suspected that the selection and pre-selection of WUAs in the
'A'
group for
loans from WB and ADB made water users aware of this transfer as all farmers need
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to endorse the proprietary papers prior to receiving loans. At the same time, only
78% ofwater users in the
'PD'
group are aware of ownership of I&D schemes. It is
assumed that a sense of ownership would empower farmers to maintain I&D
systems. Therefore, water users in the
'PD'
group need to be informed of their
ownership of irrigation schemes and their responsibility to properly operate these
schemes.
4.4.4 Conclusion
Table 4.17 presents scoring results ofoperational performance of two groups.
Table 4.17: Operational Performance Scoring
Sub-criteria
'A' 'PD'
Operation &Maintenance Plan 3 2
Rehabilitation Plan 1 1
Machinery Stock 1 1
The
'A'
group is operationally performing better than the
'PD'
group. Yet,
accomplishment of a minimum scope of the required O&M works by both groups
raises serious concerns over the future functionality of I&D structures. Budget
insolvency ofWUAs creates the insufficiency of O&M works. Managers from both
groups admitted that their current efforts are primarily oriented towards settlement of
Water Transportation Fees to the District Water Agency and payment of urgent
administrative expenses such as remuneration to WUA staff and external
service-
providers. Consequently, limited or no funds are left for O&M works. The lack of
equipment to carry out O&M works is viewed as the second most
critical factor
jeopardizing implementation ofO&M works. In fact, none of the WUAs maintain a
machinery fleet.
73
No rehabilitation and construction works were undertaken in WUAs in the
'PD'
group since the dissolution oi kolkhozes/sovkhozes. Two out of three WUAs in
the
'A'
group received loans from ADB andWB to rehabilitate their I&D structures,
while the third WUA was pre-selected for a loan. Managers of the
'A'
group
declared that it would not have been financially feasible for theirWUAs to fund such
rehabilitation works at their own expense. Meanwhile, WUAs in the
'PD'
group are
competing to get loans from ADB and WB, which have limited funds for the
rehabilitation activities in the country. It is estimated that in addition to the funds
provided by the ADB and WB, around 317,000 ha more of irrigated land needs
restoration. Around 160 WUAs are located in this land area. The government has no
funding for on-farm irrigation programs, and these WUAs are apparently not in a
position to undertake the required rehabilitation in the coming years at their own
expense. Thus, there is a risk thatWUAs would be unable to sustain I&D structures.
4.5 Organizational Performance
The viability of an organization is supported by efficient operation of internal
structural arrangements. The presence of governance elements such as transparency
and participation is also indispensable to properly manage an organization's
financial, personnel and information resources.
The organizational performance criterion explores if structural arrangements
are set inWUAs to mediate water disputes and conduct independent financial audits,
and ifprincipals of transparency and participation are followed inWUAs.
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Four measurement standards of Conflict Resolution, Independent Audit,
Transparency, and Participation are applied to assess the organizational
performance ofWUAs.
The working hypothesis is that the internal structural units, the Dispute












Purpose: To explore if arrangements are set to mediate water disputes.
(Note: The absence ofa structural unit accountablefor mediation ofwater disputes
might result in reoccurrence ofwater conflicts).
Question 26: Managers were asked: Was a Dispute Resolution Commission
established in your WUA?
Responses to Q26: Responses ofmanagers are shown in Figure 4.12.




Question 27: Farmers were asked: Which agency will you address to resolve
water conflicts? The list of mediators included: i) WUA's Conflict Resolution
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Commission; ii) Chair of WUA; Hi) Council of WUA; iv) Village Elderly Court; v)
Village Council; vi) Local Courts; and vii) None ofAgencies.
Responses to 27: Water
users'
responses are provided in Table 4.18.








WUA's Conflict Resolution Commission 21 13
Director ofWUA 51 49
Council ofWUA 0 0
Village Elderly Court 0 0
Village Council 0 0
Local Courts 0 0
None of the Agencies 28 38
Question 28: Farmers who replied "None of the Agencies in Question #27
were asked: Please indicate the key reason, among the given list offactors, why you
did not or will not address the agencies. The given factors included: i) There is no
agency charged to mediate conflicts; ii) The agencies have no expertise andpower to
mediate conflicts; Hi) Resolutions of the agencies are not obeyed by conflicting
parties; and iv) It is better to solve problem without involvement ofan agency as it
entails complications.




Table 4.19: Reasons for NotApproaching Agency in Case ofConflict, A vs. PD
Factors
There is no agency charged with conflict resolution
matters
Agencies have no expertise and power to mediate conflicts
Resolutions of these agencies are not obeyed by conflicting
parties







Question 29: Managers were questioned: How many requests to mediate
disputes didyourDispute Resolution Commission receivefrom water users in 2003?
Responses to Q29: Responses ofmanagers are provided in Table 4.20.









1st WUA 1 1
2nd WUA 2 2
3rd WUA 9 6
Data Interpretation: All associations in both groups instituted the Dispute
Resolution Commissions (Commission). These Commissions are structurally
attached to the Representative Assembly, as shown in Figure 4.13.

























group will approach a Director ofWUA to arbitrate their water disputes
but not a specialized body, the Commission. In both groups, the Commission was
only scored third in the list of mediators. Moreover, a high percentage of farmers,
around 28% in the
'A'
group and 38% in the
'PD'
group, indicated that in case of
water conflicts they would not address any agency.
To the question why water users would not approach any agency to resolve
their conflicts, complications originated from involvement of agencies in a dispute
resolution process, and failure of conflicting parties to follow resolutions of a
mediating agency were identified by both groups as core reasons.
Farmers in both groups rarely address the Commission. Table 4.20 shows that
most of the Commissions received only one or two requests to resolve disputes.
However, the actual number of water disputes emerging in WUAs is likely more;
farmers from both groups underlined that water disputes occur very frequently in
theirWUAs during the growing season.
It can be concluded that arrangements to mediate water conflicts were made
in both groups; the Dispute Resolution Commissions were established in both
groups. Yet, these commissions are functioning ceremonially rather than practically,
with strong ceremonial presence in the
'PD'
group. Discussions with farmers
disclosed that the majority of farmers are unaware of the existence of this body. It
was also revealed that farmers have an untrustworthy attitude towards institutions
assigned to mediate water conflicts. Thus, there is a risk that water conflicts would
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be recurrent in WUAs because disputes are currently regulated by individually
established rules, but not procedures regulated byWUAs.
4.5.2 Audit Revisions
Purpose: To determine if structural arrangements are established to conduct
independent financial audits. (Note: To ensurefinancial transparency, it is important
to have a unit responsiblefor conducting independent audits).
Question 30: Managers were asked: Was the Audit Commission established
in your WUA?
Responses to Q30: Figure 4.14 presents the responses ofmanagers.










Question 31: The question was raised to managers: How many audits were
carried out in your WUA in 2003?
Responses to Q31: Managers responded as shown in Table 4.21.






1st WUA 1 0
2nd WUA 1 0
3rdWUA 4 3
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Question 32: Managers were questioned: Who was an initiator of these
audits?
Responses to Q32: Table 4.22 presents the responses ofmanagers.







WUA Council 2 1
Audit Commission itself 0
r
0
Data Interpretation: The national law requires every association to establish
an Audit Commission. It is designed to independently examine accounts ofWUA
with view to ensure financial transparency. The law requires the Audit Commission
to be reportable to the Representative Assembly, and carry out at least one audit
within a year (WUA Law, 2002).
The Audit Commissions function in all associations ofboth groups. They are
structurally set as a subordinate body of the Representative Assembly, as
demonstrated in Figure 4.13. In terms of the number of audits conducted in 2003,
every advanced association
carried out at least one audit, as Table 4.21 shows,
whereas two associations in the
'PD'
group did not undertake any audit in 2003.
Table 4.22 demonstrates that the WUA Councils were major initiators of
these audits but not farmers.
Conclusion can be drawn that the structural arrangements to conduct audits
were formed in both groups: the Audit Commissions were established in two




group. Failure of two
'PD'
associations to conduct any audit in 2003 signals inactive
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participation of farmers in financial management, and a risk not to have financial
transparency in managing funds ofWUAs.
4.5.3 Transparency
Purpose: To explore the availability of information to water users about
decisions and rules ofWUAs. (Note: Better awareness offarmers about rules and
decisions would encourageparticipation offarmers in initiatives ofWUA).
Question 33: Water users were questioned: Are you aware how are the
budget resources spent in your WUA?
Responses to Q33: Figure 4.15 shows the responses ofwater users.









Ve ry we 11 Fairly well No
Question Q34: Question was asked from farmers: Are you aware ofdetails
of Operational or Rehabilitation Plan ofyour WUA for 2003, i.e. which schemes
would be maintained or rehabilitated?
Responses to Q34: Figure 4.16 presents responses of farmers.
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Yes, I am aware lam fairly aware No, I'm not aware at all
Question 35: Water users were questioned: How do you normally learn
about decisions ofWUA?
Responses to Q35: WUAmembers replied as demonstrated in Figure 4. 17.















News from otherWUA Report by managers at
members Representative Assembly
Question 36: Managers of WUAs were questioned: Were audit reports
distributed to members ofWUAs?
Responses to Q36: Figure 4.18 shows responses ofmanagers.
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Data Interpretation: As demonstrated in Figure 4.15, the majority (76%) of
water users in the
'PD'
group pointed out that they do not know about budget
spending of theirWUAs, while a high percentage (61%) of farmers in the
'A'
group
are well or fairly aware ofbudget resources.
Figure 4.16 shows that more members of advanced associations are
familiarized with details of O&M and/or Rehabilitation Plans than farmers in the
'PD'
group; 92% of farmers in the
'A'
group are well or fairly aware, whereas 91%
ofwater users in the
'PD'
group are not informed. It is suspected that the selection of
advanced associations for theWB's and ADB's loans made farmers in the
'A'
group
be aware of such plans.
As far as information sources are concerned, the majority of water users in




groups respectively) learn about
activities and decisions ofWUAs through other farmers, as shown in Figure 4.17.
In terms of the accessibility of financial accounts
to water users, all managers
in the
'A'
group pointed out that they delivered their audit
results to farmers (at the
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annual Representative Assembly), as presented in Figure 4.18. Whereas, only one
association in the
'PD'
group provided audit data to farmers as the other two
'PD'
associations did not undertake any audit in 2003.
The preceding data bring to conclusion that information is more available and
accessible to water users in the
'A'
group, who are better aware ofWUA activities




Purpose: To explore the participation of water users in activities and
decision-making process of WUAs. (Note: To attain objectives, it is important to
ensurefullparticipation ofmembers in initiatives ofWUA).
Question 37: Members ofWUAs were requested: In your opinion, what are
the mainfunctions ofyour WUA?
Responses to Q37: Responses ofwater users are given in Figure 4.19.












Water distribution Water fees collection O&M/irrigation Water Disputes
schems Mediation
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Question 38: Farmers were questioned: Are you aware ofyour rights and
responsibilities vested in the Charter?
Responses to Q38: Members ofWUAs responded as shown in Figure 4.20.




























Very well Fairlywell No
Questions 39: Members of WUAs were questioned: Did you take part in
WUA elections held in previous years?
Responses to Q39: Responses ofWUAmembers are shown in Figure 4.21.















Yes, I took part in all Not in all previous No, so fer I have not
elections elections taken part in any
election
Question 40: A question was raised to WUA members: Do you regularly
participate in meetings ofyour WUA?
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Responses: Members ofWUAs responded as shown in Figure 4.22.


















i . , _ '___
Yes, regularly Not regularly No, I havn't participated in
anyWUAmeeting
Data Interpretation: In this research, water
users'
awareness (knowledge)
about the WUA and its activities, and attendance of farmers at WUA events such as
meetings and elections are both assessed as components of the participation
criterion.
As far as the knowledge of farmers about theWUA's functions is concerned,
Figure 4.19 shows that only 13% of farmers in the
'PD'
group regard O&M of
irrigation structures as the main function ofWUA. In the
'A'
group this percentage
is much higher, 43%. The majority of interviewees in both groups identified water
distribution and waterfee collection as the core functions ofWUA.
As shown in Figure 4.20, around 76% ofwater users in the
'PD'
group are
unaware of their rights and responsibilities stipulated in Charters ofWUAs. In the
'A'
group, the majority of farmers (approximately 61%) declared that they know
well or fairly well about the scope of their rights and responsibilities.
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Speaking about participation of water users in the WUA's elections, Figure
4.21 demonstrates that the situation in both groups is similar; members are inactive
in attending elections. Around 54% of interviewees in the
'PD'
group and 36% in the
'A'
group stated that they did not take part in previous elections.





group, as displayed in Figure 4.22. Approximately 66% of members in the
'PD'
group identified that they did not participate in any meeting ofWUA. In the
'A'
group, the majority of farmers (around 72%) attend meetings.
Conclusions can be drawn that water users in the
'A'
group are more active
than farmers in the
'PD'
group. However, the level ofparticipation in the
'A'
group
is assessed as not very active.
4.5.5 Conclusion
Table 4.23 presents the scoring results regarding organizational performance
of two groups.
Table 4.23: Organizational Performance Scoring
Sub-criteria
'A' 'PD'
Conflict Resolution 2 2
Independent Audit 4 2
Transparency 4 2
Participation 3 2
Table 4.23 shows that the
'A'
group is performing better than the
'PD'
group.
In fact, the Audit Commission is operating more actively, and the governance





group. Yet, the overall organizational performance of the
'A'
group is not perfect
yet.
Poor organizational performance is largely attributed to the existence of an
informational vacuum with farmers about the mandates, functions and decisions of
WUAs, which is strongly present in the
'PD'
group. Therefore, farmers remain
inactive in taking part in WUA initiatives, and unaware of the existence of the
Dispute Resolution and Audit Commissions.
Moreover, many farmers in the
'PD'
group are unaware that maintenance of
irrigation structures is the core function ofWUA. The unawareness of farmers about
their responsibility to operate the on-farm I&D structures apparently generates their
inaction and negligence towards management of I&D systems. One such example is
the negligence of farmers to pay water fees. The lack of information also results in
farmers'
unawareness about the budget and Operational Plan, with a greater breadth
in the
'PD'
group. Such factors distance farmers from being actively involved in the
initiatives ofWUAs.
The top-down model pursued in irrigation management transfer in
Kyrgyzstan and external origination of the WUA concept may have led to limited
information provided to farmers about WUA, its mandates and functions.
Participation ofwater users will first be valid when farmers have knowledge about
the WUA. Second, farmers taking personal interest will be the key to developing
WUA. The interest of farmers should largely be evoked from the advancement of
their knowledge aboutWUA.
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A second factor regarding poor organizational performance may be an
untrustworthy attitude of farmers towards WUAs and its units. This problem
seemingly is a result of the lack of transparency in managing activities ofWUAs. In
fact, information distribution systems are poorly instituted in WUAs, and thus,
farmers are lacking good access to information. The chapter 5 presents
recommendations on how to enhance the water
users'
awareness about theWUA and
its activities.
4.6 Inter-Institutional Performance
The irrigation management transfer program in Kyrgyzstan has been
generally a top-down process. The concept of the WUA was new for the government
and country's farmers. TheMAWR had lacked the capacity to institutionalizeWUAs
until the WB's On-Farm Irrigation Project stepped in 2000 to saddle the Ministry
with permanent in-house capacity. As a result, a specialized service, the WUA
Support Unit (Unit), was established at the central, province and district levels to
form and support WUAs (WB Project Information, 2000). The inter-institutional
criterion examines the level of independence ofWUAs in managing their activities,
the responsiveness of the Unit to the needs and concerns ofWUAs, and quality of
services provided by the Unit.
Three measurement sub-criteria under inter-institutional performance include
i) Decentralization; ii) Responsiveness, Hi) Quality.
The working hypothesis is that the support from external institutions is







Purpose: To determine if WUA is independent from external agencies in
managing its activities. (Note: Decentralization provides more flexibility and less
bureaucracy in managing activities).
Question 41 : Managers from both groups were questioned: Do you consider
your WUA as an organization independentlymanaging its activities?
Responses to Q41 : Managers responded as shown in Figure 4.23.









Data Interpretation: In interviews, managers of all six associations stated
that the idea to create theirWUAs was initiated externally either by a District Water
Agency, Village Councils or MAWR. The latter agency directly approached all of
the advanced associations to create their associations under a pilot project financed
by a Japanese grant in 1998. The District Water Agency and Village Council
initiated the formation ofWUAs in the
'PD'
group. Overall, WUAs in both groups




Nevertheless, as the Figure 4.23 demonstrates, all WUAs in both groups
consider themselves as organizations independentlymanaging their activities. During
meetings, all managers also stated that their WUAs are independent from local
authorities and namely, the Village Councils, in running financial and operational
activities.
Managers ofWUAs stated that interaction between WUAs and the Unit is
very collaborative, and WUAs are free of any obligation towards the Unit, except the





could be equally regarded as independent organizations.
4.6.2 Responsiveness
Purpose: To explore the level of responsiveness of the Unit to the needs and
concerns of WUAs (Note: Being still institutionally weak, WUAs are in need of
advisory and training supportfrom the government, i.e. WUA Support Unit).
Question 42: A question was raised to managers: Is the Unit responsive to
your concerns and needs?
Responses to Q42: Managers responded as shown in Table 4.24.






Yes, very responsive 2 3
Not always responsive 1 0
No, not responsive at all 0 0
Question 43: Managers were asked: What kind of support did your
association getfrom the Unit?
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Responses to Q43: Responses of farmers are presented in Table 4.25.






Assistance for establishment and registration of
WUA with government authorities
3 3
Assistance for development ofoperational plan 2 3
Support for elaboration ofwater schedule 2 3
Legal advice 3 3
Assistance for development ofWUA budget 3 3
Training courses 3 3
Data Interpretation: Table 4.24 shows that all WUAs, except one advanced
association, pointed out that the Unit is responsive to their concerns and needs.
The Units provide the standard package of training courses and advisory
services to WUAs in the country. In this research, both groups were provided with
the same scope of services: the Unit helped WUAs to be founded or re-registered;
assisted in elaboration of their operational plans, water schedule and budgets,
consulted on legal issues, and provided training courses. Training programs
delivered by the Unit to both groups were of standard nature and devoted to various
topics including Formation of WUA, General Administration, Financial
Management, Monitoring andEvaluation, and ConflictResolution.
Based on survey results and discussions with managers
of WUAs, it is
inferred that the Unit is responsive to the needs and concerns of the two groups.
4.6.3 Quality
Purpose: To research if services provided to associations by Unit were
useful. (Note: This sub-criterion measures whether training programs and support
services provided by the Unit satisfied the needs ofWUAs).
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Question 44: Managers were questioned: Were the services provided by the
Unit useful to your WUA ?
Responses to 044: Table 4.26 presents the responses ofmanagers.





Yes, very useful 2 2
Not all of them 1 1
No, not useful at all 0 0
General Question (GO): Managers were questioned: What kind of training
programs does your WUA still need?
Response to GO: Table 4.27 presents the responses ofmanagers.






Development of short-term and long-term
Operational Plans
2
Development ofwater schedules 1 3
Improvement ofWatering Techniques 1 3
Financial and AccountingManagement 3 3
ConflictMediation 1 1
Data Interpretation: It should be first noted that the Unit delivers a standard
package of training programs to WUAs. Two WUAs in each group identified the




group marked out that not all services were ofgreat use.
Based on the answers of managers provided in Table 4.26, it can be implied
that the quality of services provided by the Unit generally satisfied the needs ofboth
groups but not to the greatest extent.
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4.6.4 Conclusion
Table 4.28 presents the scoring results regarding inter-institutional
performance of two groups.






Table 4.28 demonstrates that both groups have similar inter-institutional
performance; the two groups are equally regarded as independent organizations, and
the responsiveness as well as the quality of services provided by the Unit was quite
of the same breadth in both groups.
The great bulk of support services to WUAs is rendered by the Unit, while
assistance from the local authorities (Village Councils) is very limited. The
relationship betweenWUAs and Village Councils in both groups is more
ceremonial
than cooperative. Only one WUA in the
'A'
group indicated an existence of a
cooperative relationship with their Village Council. In this WUA, the Village
Council issuing and certifying legal, financial and proprietary documents of farmers
decided to cease providing such services to those farmers
who failed to settle their
water payments. As the manager of this WUA pointed out, such a mechanism
attributed to a higher collection ofwater fees.
It should also be noted that the scope of training programs developed and
provided by the Unit is extensive and largely designed for WUA
staff ~ managers,
accountants and hydro-engineers. However, it seems that theWUA staff is not active
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enough in disseminating the new knowledge that farmers can gain from. In general,
the operational linkage between WUAs and the farmers is very fragile and needs
improvement.
Given both an externally brought idea to create WUAs and the identical
scope of institutional support provided by the Unit to WUAs, a question arises what
other inter-institutional incentive(s) could affect the more progressive development
of the
'A'
group. One factormight stem from the fact that allWUAs in the
'A'
group
took part in a pilot project funded by the Japanese grant in 1998. This project
introduced the concept of WUA to farmers, rehabilitated a limited number of
irrigation structures, and procured office and communication equipment to WUAs.
This external support is viewed as an important incentive that had a great impact on
the advancement of the
'A'
group. In this regard, it is believed that the newly
emerging and institutionally weak WUAs need training, promotional, advocacy and
advisory support, as well as financial assistance from an external catalyst. Such a
judgment is backed up by Table 4.28 that presents a list of training programs sought
byWUAs; the number of training courses required in the
'PD'





To make an overall performance assessment ofboth groups, a scoring system
evaluating sub-criteria under the five indicative areas is
used. In this scoring system,
excellence performance of sub-criterion is given a "5", good performance - "4",
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satisfactory performance -"3", poor
performance- "2", and very poor
performance-
Table 4.29 shows the mean for each indicative area and an overall averaging
of fivemeasurements.










Compliance with Rules 3 2
Mean forLegalPerformance 3.25 2.00
Financial Performance
Collection ofFees 4 2








Mean for Financial Performance 2.40 2.20
Operational Performance
O&MPlan 3 2
Rehabilitation Plan 1 1
Ownership ofI&D Structures 5 5
Machinery 1 1














Mean for Inter -Institutional Performance 4.66 4.66
Mean 3.21 2.62
As shown in Table 4.29, the
'A'
group is functioning better than the
'PD'
group; the total average score of the
'A'
group is 3.21 versus 2.62 in the
'PD'
group.
Yet, the overall grades signal that both groups are not performing well yet with the
'A'
group operating far below good performance and the
'PD'
group runningpoorly.
The scoring comparison of the indicative areas in both groups revealed a
major distinctive feature. The scoring of legal and organizational criteria is
considerably higher in the
'A'
group than in the
'PD'
{3.25 vs. 2.00 and 3.25 vs. 2.20
in legal and organizational criteria, respectively). The scores of the other three
criteria are quite of the same range in both groups. Hence, a conclusion is drawn that
the legal and organizational criteria are apparently the factors that enabled the
'A'
group to succeed. This success may
have been facilitated by participation ofWUAs
from the
'A'
group in a pilot project financed by a Japanese grant.
A visual representation of the scoring system in Figure 4.24 also shows that




























In summary, three main conclusions can be drawn regarding the performance
of the two groups. The first conclusion is that
'A'
group is generally performing
better than the
'PD'
group. The second conclusion is that the legal and organizational
criteria are apparently the most empowering and motivating factors that enabled the
'A'
group to succeed the
'PD'
associations. The third assumption is that an external
technical and financial assistance provided by the Japanese project created a
motivating climate for the
'A'
group to develop.
Yet, an overall low grading ofperformances in both groups indicates the need
to improve operations of those sub-criteria that were scored low in Table 4.29.





Recommendations are spelled out to attack the root causes of poor
performance ofWUAs, and articulated for sub-criteria scored lower than excellence
performance ("5") in Table 4.30. Recommendations are based on the cause-effect
relationship that is examined in each indicative area.
5.2 Recommendations to Improve Legal Performance
A general conclusion regarding the legal performance of the two groups, as
discussed in Chapter 4, is that the
'A'
group is performing better than the
'PD'
group. However, both groups still lack well-instituted rules to produce reliable and
timelywater distribution.
Table 5.1 generalizes a cause-effect relationship regarding the adverse
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The next sub-sections provide recommendations to address the root causes of
the poor performance.
5.2.1 Clarity
Conclusion: Clear rules about water rights are ill instituted in both groups.
Cause I (CI): Ignorance offarmers about rules andprocedures.
Many farmers are unaware of rules and regulations established in their
WUAs. Presumably, farmers have not participated in the development and
ratification of internal rules of their WUAs. The ignorance of farmers about the
existing by-laws results in water disputes, inequitable water distribution, illegal
water diversions, and low collection ofwater fees.
Recommendations to CI: WUAs should revisit their existing rules and
procedures with involvement of a large number of farmers. Such a bottom-up and
participatory approach could create
"buy-in"
of farmers to take part in the initiatives
of WUAs. This action would also empower farmers to take part in the decision
making process. Later, the revised rules should be broadly advocated among all the
members ofWUA through meetings, discussions, and publications. It is critical that
the Zone Representatives, delegates of farmers to the General Assembly ofWUAs,
take the lead in advocacy campaigns. The Zone Representatives apparently have no
incentives to take active part in endeavors ofWUAs. Their active intervention could
be motivated through the provision of incentives available withinWUAs.
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5.2.2 Equity
Conclusion: Equitable water distribution isproblematic.
Cause II: There is no a well-defined scope of liabilities for rules violation,
and ifexist, farmers are ignorant ofthem.
WUAs have not articulated the consequences to the farmers for violation of
rules. If such bylaws exist, water users are unaware what liabilities would be applied
for violation of rules. As a result, individually established rules but not collectively
accepted procedures dominate in WUAs, which leads to inequity in water usage,
rent-seeking, illegal water diversions, and non-payment ofwater fees.
Recommendations to CII: WUAs should better articulate the scope of the
consequences to farmers for law-breaking. WUAs need to communicate these
consequences to the farmers through meetings and the Zone Representatives, and
start enforcing penalties for violation of rules.
Cause III: Inefficient enforcement ofrules.
Rules and regulations are poorly enforced in WUAs; WUAs do not
systematically impose sanctions to violators.
Recommendations to CM: Sanctions should become an integral law
enforcement mechanism of WUAs so that violators of the rules receive graduated
penalties (e.g. water rights of farmers illegally diverting water or neglecting payment
of water fees should be affected). For this purpose, WUAs should first establish
graduated sanctions for violation of internal rules. Farmers should be then informed
of these sanctions. It is important that WUAs impose sanctions to law-breakers in a
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systematic manner. The WUA Support Unit should help WUAs to design a list of
sanctions.
5.2.3 Compliance with Rules
Conclusion: Poor adherence to rules and procedures is experienced in two
groups, with a greater extent in 'PD
'
group.
Cause IV: WUA lackspower to impose rules.
WUAs lack power to efficiently apply rules. Many water users do not regard the
WUA as an institution having authority to manage water-related issues of farmers.
Hence, they ignore policies and procedures developed byWUA.
Recommendations to CIV: A community agreement to delegate a WUA
with power to manage and execute water-related activities should primarily be
reached. Farmers should collectively identify mandates, objectives, as well as short-
and long-term strategies of WUA. Such a participatory process, which was
presumably ignored during the creation of WUAs, would gear participation of
farmers in the WUA's initiatives. For this purpose, WUAs should organize a general
meeting with all farmers. Alternatively, internal meetings between farmers and
respective Zone Representatives could be first arranged so that the latter could
represent interests of farmers at a general meeting.
5.2.4 Timeliness
Conclusion: Water is not supplied tofarmers in a timelyfashion.
Cause V: Poorly executedwatering schedule.
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Watering schedules exist in all associations, but they are frequently disrupted by
illegal water diversions and priority watering give to upstream farmers. This
situation originates inequity and unreliability in water use.
Recommendation to CV: It is important to educate farmers about the
existing watering procedures through arrangement of meetings with farmers and
distribution of publications describing regulations. The Zone Representatives should
become prime distributors of information concerning watering regulations to
farmers. Assistance in development and distribution ofpublications would be needed
fromWUA Support Unit or other external funding projects.
Ditch-riders should strictly monitor the compliance with the schedule by
farmers. To efficiently enforce the watering schedule, sanctions should be imposed
in amore systematic way.
Cause VI: Poor social responsibility.
Ineffective enforcement of rules is also attributable to the existence of weak
social responsibility of farmers; farmers are not responsive to violations of rules
made by other members. This situation allows law-breakers to be free from the
graduated penalties.
Recommendation to CVI: Social responsibility of farmers can be built upon
arousing the interests (demand) of the farmers for WUAs. Personal interests of
farmers should be generated through advancement of their knowledge about WUA.
For this purpose, the outreach and advocacy activities need to be enhanced,
particularly in poorly developed WUAs. At the national level, the WUA Support
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Unit should expand its advocacy campaigns through TV and radio programs, reports
in local newspapers, and publication of brochures and pamphlets to raise awareness
of the public (farmers) about the concept ofWUA.
5.2.5 Conclusion
It is believed that implementation of these recommendations would enable
WUAs to build sound rules and regulations for production of reliable and equitable






















































































5.3 Recommendations to Improve Financial Performance
A general conclusion made regarding the financial performance of WUAs
was that both groups, with a greater breadth in the
'PD'
associations, are not
financially self-sustained agencies yet. Both groups experienced a low collection of
water fees, a high dominance of the in-kind contributions, and absence of the
Reserve Fund.
Table 5.2 generalizes a cause-effect relationship of adverse performance of








































































































































































































































































5.3.1 Collection ofWater and O&M Fees
Conclusion: Collection ofwaterfees is low.
Cause I: Minimum farming income.
A minimum farming income was identified by farmers as an underlying
factor of delayed water payments. This research did not intend to explore the causes
of the
farmers'
low income, and thus, no specific recommendations are articulated to
improve their income. Yet, it is noteworthy to state that an increase in farming
income would not necessarily result in a higher collection of water fees unless
financial management practices discussed in this sub-section are not well addressed
byWUAs.
Cause II (CII): Failure of farmers to make water payments in a timely
fashion.
All WUAs confront long delays in water payments. Delays of one year is
common in both groups. Low collection of water fees results in the insufficiency of
O&M works.
Recommendation to CII: WUAs must educate farmers about far-reaching
consequences of inadequate scope ofO&M works. Farmer should be informed of the
threat to crop production and possible increase in future maintenance costs because
of current negligence to adequately maintain I&D structures. Farmers must accept
their accountability for such consequences. WUAs should also address the delayed
water payments through introduction and efficient management of a sanction system
in order to change the behavior of farmers towards payment ofwater fees.
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Cause HI: Penalties for delayed payments are not practiced or
unsystematically imposed.
Sanctions for late payments are either not practiced by WUAs or they are
imposed on an irregular basis. The absence of enforcement mechanisms encourages
farmers to delay or not to make water payments.
Recommendation to CHI: WUAs should institute a penalty system to
change the behavior of the farmers towards water payments. Farmers should be
informed on the introduction of a sanction system and the way it works. Sanctions
will be inefficient unless they are imposed to violators in a systematic manner. The
WUA Support Unit could provide advisory services to WUAs with regard to the
development of a list of sanctions and methods to efficiently enforce penalties.
Cause IV: Inadequate calculation method.
Many WUAs do not regard the O&M fee as a fixed cost, but they consider it
a volumetric charge. As a result, the amount of O&M fee charged to farmers is less
than the actual amount of internal operational and administrative expenses.
Recommendation to CIV: Calculation methodology of the O&M fee should
be separate from the method of calculating the Water Transportation Fee. The O&M
fee should be regarded as the fixed charge representing the internal costs ofWUAs,
whereas the Water Transportation Fee should continue be charged on the amount of
water supplied to farmers. TheWUA Support Unit should assistWUAs to develop a
propermethodology to calculate the O&M fee.
Cause V: Advance payment is rarelypracticed in WUAs.
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Only one WUA in the
'A'
group exercises an advance payment for water
supply. In this WUA, a failure of the farmers to make a deposit payment (30% of the
total amount) results in shutting off the water supply to their farms. As stated by the
manager from the WUA, such amode increased the fee collection rate.
Recommendation to CV: The practice of using the advance payment mode
might be replicated in other WUAs; farmers would be required to pay water fees
prior to delivery of water to their farms. The Unit could first arrange replication of
this practice in few pilotWUAs. If the introduction of this system is successful in the
pilot WUAs, the Unit would advocate this mode as the best management practice
throughout otherWUAs.
5.3.2 Adequacy ofWater Fees
Conclusion: The level ofwaterfees is inadequately set.
Cause VI: Setting a low level ofO&Mfee.
The WB's consultants have estimated that approximately US$10 per ha needs
to be spent to sustain the current on-farm I&D structures. However, at best WUAs
are presently collecting less than US$1.0 per ha (WB Project Information, 2000).
With the assistance of the Unit, WUAs established a step-by-step plan to increase
their O&M fees in the coming five years.
Recommendation to CVI: WUAs should strictly adhere to their step-by-step
plan in elevating the O&M fee. It would be difficult for WUAs to convince the
farmers to pay a higher rate of the O&M fee unless the farmers do not comprehend
the necessity of this action and start voluntarily paying water fees. Therefore,
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advocacy and outreach campaigns explaining the urgency and need to repair I&D
structures should be enhanced inWUAs.
5.3.3. Timeliness of Fee Collection
Conclusion: Water payments are not made in a timely fashion in both
groups.
Cause: Penaltiesfor delayedpayments are notpracticed, or unsystematically
imposed.
Recommendations for these two causes are discussed in sub-sections 5.3.2
and 5.2.4 respectively.
5.3.4 Cash vs. In-kind Payment
Conclusion: The percentage of in-kind contributions made is very high.
Cause: Existence oflow collection rate.
WUAs encounter a very high percentage of in-kind contributions made by
farmers both for O&M and Water Transportation Fees. This originates high
transaction costs and disbursement of extra expenditures by WUAs such as storage
and transportation expenses. The low collection rate experienced in WUAs impedes
managers to reduce the in-kind contribution rate.
Recommendation to CVH: WUAs should gradually reduce the percentage
of in-kind contributions by educating farmers about the negative effects derived from
this mode of payment. WUAs should develop a schedule to gradually reduce the
in-
kind contributions, with the involvement of farmers into the formulation and
ratification process. Once such a baseline is established and notified to farmers,
WUAs should strictly adhere to the endorsed scheme.
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5.3.5. Reserve Fund
Conclusion: Both groups ofWUAs have not established the Reserve Funds.
Cause VIII: Budget insolvency.
Budget insolvency ofWUAs hampers the establishment of the Reserve Fund.
The absence of the Reserve Fund will jeopardize the arrangement of urgent and
major O&M works inWUAs.
Recommendation to Cause VIII: The establishment of the Reserve Fund
should be on the agenda ofWUAs for the coming years.
5.3.6 Conclusion
It is believed that implementation of these recommendations would help
WUAs to strengthen their financial status. Figure 5.2 visualizes a list of adverse




















































































5.4 Recommendations to Improve Operational Performance
General conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 regarding the operational
performance were that both groups, with a greater degree in the
'PD'
associations,
are financiallyweak to sustain I&D structures.
Table 5.3 generalizes a cause-effect relationship regarding adverse





































































































































































5.4.1 Operation & Maintenance (O&M) Plan
Conclusion: WUAs did not carry out required O&Mworks.
Cause I: Budget insolvency.
Budget insolvency is the underlying factor of the insufficient scope ofO&M
works undertaken in WUAs. As a result, deterioration of the on-farm irrigation
structures continues to occur.
Recommendation to CI: Given the government's inability to financially
supportWUAs, internal fundraising should become a key strategy ofWUAs. For this
purpose, WUAs need to gradually increase the level of their O&M fees, and ensure
timely as well as full payment of water fees by the farmers. The latter is to be
achieved through the application of financial management practices discussed in the
previous section. Some of those practices are the introduction of advance payment
for water supply, imposition of a sanction system for late payments, reduction of
in-
kind contributions, and use of the right mode to calculate O&M fees. It is very
important to educate farmers about the far-reaching consequences entailing from
insufficiency of O&M works with view to motivate them to voluntarily pay water
fees.
Cause II: Lack ofequipment to O&M irrigation structures.
WUAs lack equipment to maintain I&D structures, and currently, have no
funds to procure new machines and equipment. The lack of equipment jeopardizes
the accomplishment ofO&M works.
Recommendation to CII: WUAs operating in one locale (e.g. district) might
set up a joint machinery fleet to use equipment and machines on a rotation basis. To
117
do so, WUAs should allocate funds first for procurement of the most required
equipment; more equipment can be purchased later when WUAs stabilize their
financial situation.
5.4.2 Rehabilitation Plan
Conclusion: WUAs are not in a position to restore I&D structures at their
own expense.
Cause III: Budget insolvency.
WUAs lack financial resources to rehabilitate the on-farm I&D structures. It
is assumed that the budget insolvency ofWUAs would delay rehabilitation works for
another uncertain period of time. Some I&D schemes required restoration even in the
Soviet era, but until now they have not been rehabilitated. The WB's and ADB's
projects intend to rehabilitate irrigation structures for a total area of 215,000 ha.
However, around 317,000 ha of more irrigated land require urgent rehabilitation
works (around 160 WUAs are located at this land area), but WUAs are not in the
position to repair I&D schemes in the coming years.
Recommendation to CHI: Given the financial insolvency ofWUAs and the
lack of government funds for on-farm irrigation programs, external financial support
is needed to rehabilitate the priority I&D structures in the country; WUAs are
currently unable to sustain I&D infrastructure without external funding. External
assistance would be vital input in strengthening WUAs. Given extensive reliance of
the national crop production on irrigation, this issue is viewed to be crucial. The
WUA Support Unit might assist external sponsoring agencies to identify the priority
and urgent rehabilitation works to be carried out in the country.
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5.4.3 Machinery Stock
Conclusion: Both groups lack equipment to maintain irrigation structures.
Cause IV: Lack offinancial resources.
Recommendation: Recommendation for this factor is discussed in sub-section
5.4.1 above.
5.4.4 Ownership of I&D structures
Conclusion: Ignorance ofownership rights.
Cause V: Poor advocacy ofownership ofthe on-farm I&D infrastructure.
Farmers in
'PD'
group are ill aware of their ownership rights for I&D structures.
Recommendation to CV: WUAs should inform farmers of their ownership of
irrigation schemes. Such information should be distributed to farmers during regular
meetings.
5.4.5 Conclusion
It is believed that implementation of these recommendations would assist
WUAs to ensure the long-term sustainability of I&D structures. Figure 5.3 visualizes
a list of adverse causes discussed in this section.
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5.5 Recommendations to Improve Organizational Performance
General conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 with regard to the organizational
performance were that the structural units assigned to mediate water disputes and
conduct audits function more ineffectively in the
'PD'
group, and principals of
transparency and participation are also not visible in the
'PD'
group.
Table 5.4 presents a summary of cause-effect relationship regarding adverse
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5.5.1 Participation (Awareness and Involvement)
Conclusion: Ignorance offarmers about WUA.
Cause I: Informational gap about WUA, its mandates andfunctions.
Many farmers are ignorant about the mandate and functions ofWUAs, and not
always aware that they are assigned by the government to manage the on-farm I&D
structures. Water users are also unaware of the details of O&M plans, and the
amount of funds required to maintain I&D structures. As a result, farmers are not
committed to participate in and put into practice the initiatives ofWUAs.
Recommendation to CI: It is critical to create the demand and
"buy-in"
of
farmers for WUAs. For this purpose, extensive outreach campaigns should be
arranged to educate farmers about the concept and functions of WUA. The Zone
Representatives should become prime actors of such campaigns and establish close
dialogue and communication with farmers. Advocacy tools such as TV and radio
programs, reports in local newspapers, publication ofpamphlets and booklets should
accompany outreach campaigns to widely promote the idea ofWUA among farmers.
Cause II: Untrustworthy attitude offarmers to WUA.
There is an untrustworthy attitude of farmers to WUA, which distances them
from being actively involved in endeavors ofWUA.
Recommendation to CII: To build credibility, WUA should address
concerns and problems of farmers. For this purpose, WUAs should effectively
manage the operation of its internal structural units and agents (ditch-riders, Zone
Representatives, Water Dispute Resolution and Audit Commissions, etc.). WUAs
should also form close communication with farmers to get to know their genuine
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problems, and duly report them about successes or drawbacks in solving their
problems.
5.5.2 Conflict Resolution
Conclusion: Dispute Resolution Commission (Commission) functions
ceremonially.
Cause HI: Lack of information disseminated tofarmers about the
Commission.
The Commission is not active in mediating water disputes. Water users rarely
approach the Commission to resolve their water conflicts. This results in the
recurrence ofwater disputes.
Recommendation to CHI: Members of the Commission should educate
farmers about objectives and functions of the body. Meetings and discussions should
also be arranged with farmers to educate them about the rules ofwater distribution
and use. Publications highlighting the mission of the Commission would be helpful
to better convey the message to farmers.
5.5.3 Audit Commission
Conclusion: Audit Commission works inactively.
Cause V: Lack of information disseminated to farmers about the
Commission.
Farmers are ill-informed about the operation of the Audit Commission. Poor
operation of the Audit Commission might constrain financial transparency inWUAs.
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Recommendation to CV: Members of the Audit Commission should
educate farmers about the goals and functions of the Audit Commission, and
procedures to initiate audits. They should report the audit results to the farmers in a
timely fashion through the Zone Representatives andmeetings.
Cause VI: Inactive participation offarmers in financial management of
WUAs.
In general, farmers are unaware of the financial situation of their WUAs.
Without such knowledge, it will be difficult for WUAs to convince farmers to pay a
higher O&M fee.
Recommendation to CVI: WUAs should regularly distribute budget related
information and reports to the farmers through the Zone Representatives and
meetings. The Audit Commission needs to report its audit results to water users in a
timely manner through organization of meetings and distribution of information
through the Zone Representatives.
5.5.4 Transparency
Conclusion: Information about decisions and activities of WUA is
unavailableforfarmers.
Cause VII: There is no well-established system ofinformation dissemination.
WUAs are lacking an efficient system for distribution of information. As a
result, an informational vacuum is in existence.
Recommendation to CVII: It is critical that the Zone Representatives
become liaison agents betweenWUA and farmers. Furthermore, WUAs shouldmake
125
their financial and operational data easily accessible to farmers though posting them
at public boards, organization of meetings with farmers, and distribution of
information to farmers by the Zone Representatives.
5.5.5 Conclusion
It is believed that implementation of these recommendations would help
WUAs (especially the
'PD'
group) improve organizational effectiveness. Figure 5.4








































































5.6 Recommendations to Improve Inter-Institutional Performance
General conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 with regard to the inter-institutional
performance of two groups were that WUAs independently manage their activities,
and there exist a client-customer approach between WUA and the WUA Support
Unit. However, a few ofWUAs reported that the quality of services provided by the
Unit needs improvement.
Table 5.5 presents a summary of cause-effect relationship regarding the
performance ofQuality sub-criterion under the inter-institutional performance.




Quality Services provided by the








Conclusion: Services provided by the WUA Support Unit were limited in use.
Cause I: Standardization oftraining courses.
The Unit provides support and training services to WUAs nationwide.
Training programs delivered to WUAs are seemingly of a standardized model. Such
standardization restricts suitability of training courses to individual needs and
concerns ofWUAs.
Recommendation to CI: The Unit needs to use a bottom-up approach in
development of its training programs. Through dialogue and consultations, the Unit
should identify genuine needs of WUAs to strengthen their capacity for assuming
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new responsibilities. The Unit should also include the best management practices of
national WUAs into training programs to promote success of participatory irrigation
management in a broader way. Outreach and advocacy campaigns including national
TV and radio programs, publication of newsletters, and distribution of promotional
booklets, pamphlets and video materials should accompany training programs and be
extensively used.
5.6.2 Conclusion
It is believed that implementation of these recommendations would help
WUA Support Unit to better build the capacity ofWUAs. Figure 5.5 visualizes an
adverse cause discussed in this section.
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The IrrigationManagement Transfer (DVIT) program in Kyrgyzstan should be
viewed as an extensively top-down model promoted by the government since 1994.
This program has been a part of agricultural, economic, and institutional policies
pursued in the country under the transition program. In a decade long process of the
institutionalization ofWUAs, a relatively strong resistance from farmers to assume
the operation and maintenance responsibilities was encountered. In fact, the DVIT
program in Kyrgyzstan has been rather a slow process because the following
conditions, among others, constrained its rapid development.
1. The IMT program was not originally accompanied by sound legal framework.
There were several bylaws adopted by the government, but they failed to support
the transfer of authority and responsibilities over to the farmers. Only the latest
statutes of 1997 and 2002 created a more enabling legal environment for the
establishment and development ofWUAs.
2. The authority to manage the on-farm irrigation structures was not primarily
delegated to WUAs. At the outset of the program, the Village Councils
encountering financial insolvency were assigned with the task to operate
irrigation schemes. In the pursuit of the government resolution of 1995, the latter
agency had to re-transfer the irrigation management to WUAs. The re-transfer
program had turned out to be a continuous and chaotic process.
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3. An informational gap about the concept of WUA existed in the country. The
notion of EVIT was new both for the government and the farmers. This
informational vacuum has been filling in a very slow-paced manner. As a result,
many farmers do not comprehend well the idea ofWUA.
4. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) responsible for
implementing the IMT process in the country lacked an in-house capacity to
institutionalize WUAs until the WB decided to launch its On-Farm Irrigation
Project in 2000. Under the framework of this project, the WUA Support Unit, a
specialized department designed to establish and strengthen WUAs, was
established as early as 2001.
5. The ongoing reforms in the agricultural sector did not result in the formation of a
strong organizational network of farming agencies to support the establishment
and growth of WUAs. Instead, the newly established peasant farms and
cooperatives, which replaced the old collective farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes),
remain to be financially fragile and disunited.
6. During the formation phases of WUAs, leaders and staff of the newly created
WUAs were not provided with sufficient information, support services and
professional training regarding the establishment and management of WUAs.
Consequently, WUAs failed to extensively promote the idea of WUAs to
farmers. In some associations, farmers are still ill-informed of the mandates and
functions ofWUA.
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7. WUAs inherited a deteriorating irrigation and drainage (I&D) infrastructure,
which was shoddily constructed during the Soviet Union. Half of the structures
required rehabilitation in 1991. Hence, investment costs (O&M and rehabilitation
costs) had already been high for the newly establishedWUAs.
Based on the research results, a general conclusion is made that WUAs in
Kyrgyzstan are still institutionally fragile and financially not self-reliant. The thesis
shows that WUAs are not likely to ensure the long-term physical sustainability of
I&D structures, and can hardly ensure a reliable and equitable water distribution to
farmers. The following factors summarizing the performance of the WUAs surveyed
are apparently the attributes commonly sharedwith all theWUAs in the country.
1. Many farmers, especially in the
'PD'
group, lack clear perception about
WUA and its mandates, and are not always aware of the change in
management of on-farm I&D systems. A large number of water users are
unaware of their water rights and responsibilities. This informational gap
distances farmers from being actively involved in and contributing to the
initiatives ofWUA.
2. A customer-client relationship between farmers and WUAs is very fragile.
The weakest relationship was found in the
'PD'
group where farmers
disregard WUA as a full-fledged institution assigned to manage their
water-
related issues. The lack of a community agreement about objectives and
functions ofWUAs, as well as non-participation of farmers in formulation of
strategies, policies and by-laws of WUA has presumably resulted in this
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relationship. A weak linkage between farmers and WUAs is also attributable
to the inefficient operation of representative governance mechanisms of
WUAs, including poor work of the Zone Representatives. In general, it is
unclear if the government intends to promote the representative governance
or maximize direct user participation in the development of WUAs in the
country.
3. Rules and procedures are inconsistently enforced in WUAs. In most cases,
water users are unaware of internal regulations, including consequences for
violation of the rules. As a result, wrongdoers and law-abiding members
enjoy the same water rights. On the other side, WUAs lack power to enforce
the rules. As such, illegal water diversions, rent-seeking, and priority
watering by upstream farmers are still evident in WUAs. The poor
enforcement of laws constrains equitable and timely water distribution to
farmers, and leads to recurrent water disputes.
4. A decision-making authority is predominantly exercised by leaders of
WUAs, with a strong and broad influence shown in the
'PD'
group. Farmers
take an inactive part in formulation, planning, and management of the
WUA's activities. Water users rarely participate in meetings, discussions, and
elections.
5. WUAs are encountering considerable budget insolvency stemming from a
low collection of water fees by farmers. The indebtedness to the government
for water transportation is faced by almost all the WUAs. The indebtedness
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also reduces the amount of public funding available for O&M of inter-farm
irrigation structures (the water transportation fee is a revenue source for the
MAWR to manage main canals and reservoirs nationwide).
6. Budget insolvency jeopardizes implementation of O&M plans by WUAs.
WUAs do not carry out the required maintenance works. The insufficiency
and inadequacy of O&M works arouses serious concerns over future
functionality of I&D structures. It is assumed that the financial insolvency of
some WUAs might also be encountered in the coming few years given (i) the
low rise in farming income (the rise is constrained, amongst other reasons, by
a fractured input supply system, low working capital of farming entities,
insufficient farm management practices, limited output markets, and high
trade tariffs in neighboring countries), and (ii) an impotent management
capacity of WUAs. Given the anticipated limited budgets of WUAs, it is
assumed that the scope of O&M works might remain insufficient in the next
years as well.
7. The financial insolvency of WUAs also postpones the accomplishment of
required rehabilitation works for another uncertain period of time. Given the
lack of government funding for on-farm irrigation programs on one side and
the budget insolvency of WUAs on another side, an external funding
assistance is considered to be critical for the restoration of the priority I&D
schemes in the country.
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8. Structural units of WUAs including the Dispute Resolution and Audit
Commissions do not function efficiently. As a consequence, water disputes
are recurrent, and there is no financial transparency in managing budget
resources in WUAs.
The research concludes that the legal and organizational criteria are the factors
influencing most the development of WUAs, at least at their primary stage of
evolution. Consequently, it is believed that the legal and organizational elements
such as participation, the rule of law, knowledge about the WUA, and transparency,
among other components, need to be improved in the weak WUAs. The research
provides a list of recommendations to improve the performance of these components.
The research also concludes that external technical and financial assistance
provided by the Japanese grant project in 1998 may have resulted in a more rapid
development of the recipient-WUAs compared with non-recipients. This Japanese
project delivered training courses, procured a small number of equipment, and
allotted financial resources for rehabilitation of irrigation structures. Hence, it is
conceived that support from an external catalyst (local government agency and/or
other external party) is needed to advance the development ofweakWUAs.
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6.2 Key Issues for Future Research
Research to date and reports highlighting an Irrigation Management Program in
Kyrgyzstan is very limited. It is believed that this thesis documents key features of
contemporary development ofWUAs.
This research used primary data to analyze the performance of WUAs, and
applied five different indicative criteria to measure successes and failures of
associations. Yet, there are few recommendations that could make future research a
more scrupulous analysis.
1. To evaluate the research results, this thesis applied both qualitative and
quantitative methods. Yet, the quantitative methods are not validated by
statistical models. In future studies, it would be advisable to use statistical
models (e.g. regression analysis, etc.) to validate research data.
2. To reveal potential impacts of irrigation management transfer process on the
farming income level, it could be important to include agricultural
productivity and economics impacts indicators in future research.
3. To better comprehend the driving forces of development of WUAs, social
elements such as income level, gender, and age could be also explored.
4. To enable generalization, farmers are advised to be selected through
systematic random sampling, and preferably according to location of fields to
irrigation headworks.
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5. For assessment of irrigation improvements, the future research studies might
use with-and-without comparisons with control for the contending effects of
physical improvements.
Application of the foregoing indicators would reveal another research data
for sustainable development ofWUAs in Kyrgyzstan.
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Figure 4.10: Availability ofMachinery and Equipment for O&M.




Figure 4.12: Structural Hierarchy ofWUAs
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Annex 1. Survey Form - Managers ofWUAs
QUESTIONNAIRE
/. General Information:
1 . Name of yourWUA:
2. Location ofWUA: Village: District: Region:
3. Are you: Individual farmer: Member ofpeasant farm: Others:
4. Do you know when yourWUA was established? Yes No
a). If answered "Yes", please indicate: Month: Year:
5. Have you been a member ofWUA since its establishment? Yes No
a) If answered "Yes", did you participate in the process of instituting WUA,
and namely in:
First General Assemblymeeting: Yes No
Election of the Council members: Yes No
Discussions and approval of the Charter: Yes No
b) Did you discuss provisions of the Charter?
Yes in a detailed way Yes but fairly No
c). Ifjoined later: Were you introduced to the provisions ofCharter and other
internal regulations?
Yes in a detailed way Yes but fairly No





7. Are you aware of your rights and responsibilities vested in the Charter and other
internal regulations with regard to your membership withWUA?
Very well Fairy well No
144
8. How would you prioritize the importance of the following factors for your crop
production? Please rank the most important factor as
"1"
and least important as
"6", and use
"N/A"













your limits for water use
"M" "Least"
a). Payment ofwater fees
b). Use ofwater by upstream farmers
c). Water scarcity
d). Water schedule
e). Size of land
10. Do you think that some members of yourWUA are given more rights for water
use than you do?
Yes, some farmers are given more rights than I do
No, everybody has equal rights_
a). If answered "Yes", please identifywhichWUAmembers have more rights for
water use. Yes No




Those who timely settle water payments
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1 1 . Are there any other factors making water distribution inequitable in yourWUA?
Yes No
If answered "yes", please specify other factors that you think make water




12. Is water distributed timely to your farm, i.e. as per schedule developed byWUA?
Strictly as per schedule Delays seldom occur Delays regularly occur
Delays always occur
_
13. Please rank the importance of factors causing delays in water delivery. Rank -1
means "The Most Important
Factor"
and Rank 8 means "The Least Important
Factor":
Rank:
Level ofwater in reservoirs is low:
Upper farmers are given priority in watering:
Wealthy farmers are given priority:
Leaders ofWUA are given priority:
Water is illegally diverted by someWUAmembers:
Bribery takes places to water out of turn:
Poor control ofwater schedule by ditch-riders:
14. Did you ever approachWUA to improve compliance with water schedule?
Yes No
If answered "Yes", were appropriate actions taken byWUAmanagers?
Yes, compliance became stricter No, no changes occurred so far
If answered "No", please indicate your three reasons for not approaching WUA:
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- WUA managers are not trusted byme as they violate
water schedules themselves:
Rent-taking is more efficient that addressingWUA:
- They are not in position to control situation as nobody obeys
their instructions:
Situation of end-tail farmers won't change:
No sanctions are imposed to violators:
My request won't be considered byWUA management:
15. Do you receive enough water to irrigate your land? Yes No
If answered "No", what in your opinion causes inadequacy of water release.
Please select one of the following important factors.
- Degradation of irrigation structures:
Low level ofwater in reservoirs:
- Upper farmers divert much water thatmake less water
available for end-tail users:
- UpstreamWUAs in the district divert morewater than
downstream WUAs
- District Water Agency poorly controls water supply:
16. Do you think that violators of rules and regulations established by WUA are
penalized accordingly?
Yes, I think they are penalized accordingly?
No, they are not always penalized accordingly
No, they are not penalized at all
If answered "No", please indicate the main reason why violators are not properly
penalized:
- penalties exist, but wealthymembers ofWUA use bribery
to avoid penalties:
- penalties are not strict enough:
-
violators are not always caught:
- penalties are rarely imposed:
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17. Will you approach the WUA management to improve the penalty system if they
need to be changed? Yes, I will approach them No, I will not approach them_
If answered "No", do you think that no changes will occur even if you
approachWUA because:
Bribery will continue taking place:
Members will not follow instructions:
ofWUA management:
WUA will not take any actions:
My request won't be considered by
WUA management:
18. Do conflicts/disputes arise between members of your WUA because of water
distribution?
Yes, they happen often
They happen rarely
No, they never happen
19. What topics lead most to conflicts/disputes in yourWUA? Please rank your
responses: Rank 1 "TheMost Disputed Topic", Rank 2 "VeryDisputed Topic", and
Rank 3 "Often Disputed
Topic"
Water distribution among upper and end-tail farmers:
Illegal water diversion:
Disputes between WUAmembers and ditch-riders over
water schedule
20. Which agency or whom did you and will you address to mediate conflicts?






None of the Agencies:
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21. If answered "None of the Agencies", please indicate the main reason why you
didn't or will not address the above agencies:
- there is no agency charged to resolve conflicts
- the above agencies have no expertise and power
to mediate conflicts:
the resolutions of these agencies are not obeyed
by conflicting parties:
It is better to solve problem without involvement of
agency as it will complicates process:
22. Who/which agency do you think is the owner of irrigation schemes used by your





23. In cases when you did not timely and fully settle your payments (water
transportation and/or O&M fees):
Were your voting right was affected?
Yes, I had less voting right No, I had the same voting right
Were forbidden to receive water and/or supplied water proportionally to your
payments made?
Yes, I was forbidden to receive water
Yes, I received water proportionally to my payment
No, non-payment did not effect the volume ofwater
supplied
24. Will you consider paying a higher level of ISF? Yes No
If answered "No", you are not willing to pay a higher level of ISF because:
It is the government's responsibility to cover water fees as a whole:
- Water should be delivered free of charge as before:
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-
Inability to cover higher level of ISF because of low
farming income:
I don't see a reason ofpaying a higher level of ISF
25. Are you aware how O&M fees are spent byWUA management?
Yes Fairly well No
If answered "No", please provide one "The Most
Important"
and one "The Least
Important"
reasons why you are not aware ofWUA spendings:
WUA management does not report financial spendings:
I don't have access to financial data:
I don't have right to know financial spendings:
I am not interested in knowing financial spendings:
26. Are you aware of operational plan (OP) ofWUA for this year, i.e. what irrigation
schemes will be rehabilitated?
Yes, I am aware I am fairly aware No, I am not aware at all
If answered "Fairly
aware"
or "No", please rank "The Important
Reason"
causing
your unawareness about OP
WUAmangers never share information about OP:
I am not interested in knowing OP as WUA managers are
responsible
for O&M:
I learn about OP post facto at the end of the year when
WUA Chair submits a Report to the General Assembly:
27. Do you regularly participate in meetings of yourWUA?
Yes, regularly Not regularly No, so far I have not participated
in anyWUA meetings
28. Did you take part in WUA elections held in previous years?
Yes, I took part
Not in all previous elections
No, so far I have not taken part in any election
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29. How do you normally learn about decisions ofWUA? Through:
Participation in WUA meetings:
News from otherWUA members:
Post-facto report byWUA managers
at General Assembly:
30. Do you have knowledge on watering (better time for watering, how much to
water, etc)?
Yes, I have watering skills No, I don't have watering skills
31. Do you think thatWUA activities can be changed for better?
Yes, they can be changed No, they cannot be changed
32. Please identify what needs to be changed to improve operation of yourWUA so
that irrigation infrastructure would function better and water would be equitably
distributed. Please rank one "The Most Important
Factor"
as Rank 1, "Very
Important
Factor"
as Rank 2 and "The Least Important
Factor"




- Re-election ofWUA management board:
Increase ofO&M fee:
- More involvement ofWUAmembers in development ofOM
and budgeting plans:
Transparency in managing WUA activities by seniors:
Financial assistance from the government:
- Advisory assistance from the government:
Institution ofConflict Resolution Committees:
- Open information sharing from WUAManagers:
More training courses:
- Procurement ofnew O&M equipment:
33. Are you satisfied so far with the work and achievements ofWUA as a whole?
Yes, I am very satisfied I am fairly satisfied
No, I am fully dissatisfied
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2. Location ofWUA: Village: District: Region:
3. Who initiated the establishment ofyourWUA?
Farmers
,
Donor agency , Village Council , District WaterAgency_
4. When was yourWUA establi shed? Month Year
5. Was yourWUA re-registered as per new law onWUA? Yes No
6. What is the current number ofmembers ofyourWUA? members
7. How many of them are large peasant farms and individual households?
9. What is the total irrigated area served by yourWUA? ha of land
10. What is the total length of irrigation scheme served by yourWUA? km








12. How long have you been occupying this position? Since
13. Have you ever been re-elected to this position?
Yes, I was re-elected , No, it my first position
14. How is a voting right of each member of yourWUA constituted?
- Each member has one voting right irrespective ofhis land size
- Each member has one voting right depending on his land size
- Each member is given a voting right depending
on actual payments made
15. Did any conflict arise between peasant farms & small households regarding
distribution ofvoting rights? Yes No
16. Were irrigation structures transferred to your WUA from Village Councils or
other owners? Yes No
a). If answered "Yes", was the irrigation transfer an easy and rapid process?
Yes No
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b). If answered "No", please specify what caused the delay in transferring
irrigation structures:
resistance from Village Council to transfer irrigation systems
- competition of several WUAs for ownership rights
- intention of current owner, which is different from Village
Council, to sell irrigation infrastructure to WUA
18. Does your WUA have operation plan (O&M/Rehabilitation Plan) for the current
year (2003)? Yes ,No
19. Was the OP for 2003 fully implemented by yourWUA?
Yes, it was fully implemented
It was partially implemented
No, it was not implemented at all
a) If answered "Partially or Not Implemented At All", what factors caused the
non-implementation ofOP?
- Low collection ofO&M fee fromWUAmembers
- Lack ofpropermachinery & equipment to maintain and
rehabilitate irrigation schemes
Setting up a lower level ofO&M fee that caused
insufficient funds accumulated
Poor support fromWUA members to undertake minor
O&M works
- Lack of expertise to develop a proper OP
- Lack of support from District Water Unit to assist in
development ofoperational plan
20). Overall, what percentage of your OP was implemented byWUA
as of today, late Dec'03? %
21). Did the water fee level set for 2003 allow yourWUA to fully cover O&M costs?
Yes, it allowed to fully cover O&M costs
It partially allowed to cover all O&M costs
No, it failed to fully cover O&M costs
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a). If answered "Partially
Allowed"
or "No", do you think that it resulted from:
lack of expertise in setting up an adequate level ofO&M fee
-
consciously setting a low level ofO&M fee as it was known that
WUA would be unable to cover the required/higher level of
O&M fee
-
setting of an adequate level ofO&M fee but collection
rate was low
- late payments made in kind and cash byWUAmembers
- urgent rehabilitation works were required to be accomplished
but their costs were not foreseen in OP
22. What was the collection rate ofO&M fee in yourWUA in 2003 (incl. cash and in
kind contributions) %
23. Was it higher than in previous years? Yes , No
a) If answered "Yes", do you think that it was higher in 2003 because:
Agricultural proceeds ofWUA members were higher
compared with previous years
WUA became more aware of the importance of
maintaining irrigation schemes
Penalty system became stricter that changed the attitude
ofWUA members
Overall financialmanagement system was improved
inWUA (better tracking system, etc.)
24. What percentage ofpayment can be made in kind? %
25. Does the in-kind payment impose complications in accumulating funds?
Yes No
26. Is it allowed to make a 100% in-kind payment? Yes No
27. Do WUA members make payment (cash and in kind) with delays?
Yes, fees are mostly paid with delays
Fees are often paid with delays
No, fees are not paidwith delays at all
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28. Are any penalties charged for delays in making payment? Yes No_
a). If answered "Yes", are they helpful? Yes No
29. Does your WUA practice involvement of WUA members in routine O&M
activities (manual labor) that can be counted toward their payment to WUA?
Yes, its is widely practiced in ourWUA
It is rarely practiced
No, it is not practiced at all
30. How much percentage ofyourWUA budget is spent for payroll cost? %
3 1 . Does yourWUA have a long-term operational plan (a five-year plan)?
Yes No
32. Does yourWUA have a Reserve Fund designed to cover future major repairs and
costs of emergencies?
33. Was yourWUA established with assistance of any donor agency?
Yes No
a). If answered "Yes", which donor agency supported establishment of your WUA?
Name of donor agency:
34. Is yourWUA still getting assistance from this donor agency? Yes No
35. Was yourWUA provided with any advisory, informational and training support
fromWUA Support Unit?
Yes, support was provided from
No, ourWUA was not provided any support from these units
b). If answered "Yes", what kind of support did or do you get from these
services:
assistance for establishment and registration of
ourWUA
assistance for development ofOP
support for elaboration ofwater schedule
advice on legal issues
assistance for development ofWUA budget
and advice on financial issues
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various training courses
c). Were the services provided by these agencies useful?
Yes, very useful , Not all of them , No, not useful
d). Are these agencies responsive to all your concerns and needs?
Yes, very responsive
Not always responsive
No, not responsive at all
35. Do you consider that your WUA is a self-managed organization governing its
financial, organizational, and administrative issues independently from water agency,
Village Council or other government agency?
Yes, I consider it as a fully independent agency _
No, ourWUA is still dependent onwater agency
36. Is there any Dispute Resolution Commission in yourWUA? Yes No_
a) If answered "Yes", how many appeals for dispute resolution have you
received in 2003? appeals in total
b). Were there any cases when the commission was not able to settle dispute,
and thus, the case was appealed to an Elderly Court or a local court? Yes No
37. Is there an Audit Commission in yourWUA? Yes No
a). If answered "Yes", how many audits did yourWUA have this year?
b). Who was an initiator of these revisions?
WUA members WUA Council Audit Commission itself
c). How were the audit results announced to WUAmembers? Yes , No_
38. How many General Assemblymeetings have been held in 2003? meetings
39. In your view, what type of training courses do yourWUA and its members most
need:
Financial and AccountingManagement
Development of short-term and long-term OPs
Development ofwater scheduling
Watering Techniques
ConflictMediation
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